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撮要 
是次硏究旨在探討政治機會結構(?0比化&1 opportunities structure)與 
香港公共房屋運動的關係，硏究範圍由1 9 8 0年至 1 9 9 5年， 
重點則放在19 9 1年至 1 9 9 5年•硏究結果顯示了香港公共房 
屋運動在後過渡期所遇到的處境，及政黨對其的威脅• 
Abstract 
The theme of the research is to understand the relationship between the political 
opportunities structure and the public housing movement of Hong Kong. The 
research covers the years from 1980 to 1995. But emphasis is placed on the 
period from 1991 to 1995. It is the period from which the notion of a 
representative government has entered its final stage before the transition. In 
addition, it also witnessed the emergency and the proliferation of political parties. 
The research is based on the premise that the political opportunities structure 
should not be made identical with the domain of resources. Instead, they should 
be more strictly defmed to achieve analytical clarity. With regard to the 
political opportunities structure, four dimensions are examined, namely, formal 
and informal access to challengers; the state's propensity of repression; policy 
and strategic orientations of the grass-root oriented political parties; and the 
stability of the political alignment. 
The methodology is based on documentary analysis and in-depth interviews. 
Two case studies are implemented to compare and contrast two specific 
relationship patterns between political parties and resident groups. Collective 
action events that concerned about public-housing issues, are employed as the 
units of analysis for the reason of their accessibility in newspapers. More 
significantly, they serve as an effective indicator for the research to understand 
the organizational strength or mobilization capacity of resident groups. A new 
conceptual devise, i.e., cadre-oriented vs. mass-oriented, is employed to 
conceptualize the collective actions. 
Significant fmdings are revealed by the research. The rising trend of 
collective action events from 1991 to 1995 and the relatively large number of 
annual cases in the same period were the combined result of the retreat of 
resident groups from the formal institution; the policy and strategic orientation of 
the grass-root oriented political parties; the protrusion of pro-China resident 
organizations; and the tolerant position of the Hong Kong Government. With 
regard to the specific position of resident groups, the real challenge has the grass-
root oriented political parties posed to them was the absorption of the potential 
force of tenant participation, rather than competing with them to persuade tenants 
to join the action. The research also demonstrates the differences between the 
logic of electoral politics and the logic of mass participation. The dissonance 
with the former logic helped to account for the retreat of resident groups from the 
formal institution. The case studies imply the vulnerability of resident groups 
as the pillars or participants of the public housing movement, and the problem of 
legal legitimacy still bothering them. The research also justifies the separation 
of the political opportunities structure from the domain of resources in analysis. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In this research, the main theme is to understand the relationship between 
political opportunities structure and social movements. The public housing 
movement of Hong Kong is employed as an illustration. Emphasis is placed on 
the period since the early 90's. It is the time from which the notion of a 
representative government has entered a new stage with the introduction of direct 
election in the Legislative Council, and the territory began to witness the 
proliferation of political parties and groups. 
The selection of the public housing movement as the unit of analysis is not 
arbitrary but is justified by the following considerations. 
The public housing movement, most significantly, offers a good example 
for the research to delineate how changes in the political opportunities structure 
interact with movement development. The emergency of the public housing 
movement was a response to the closed political system that lacked formal 
channels for mass political participation. With the inauguration of the 1982 
District Board Election, most of the movement organizations or resident groups 
began to send members to campaign in elections. However, they tended to 
retreat from participating in institutional politics after a few elections. Since the 
early 90's, they seem to have endured more serious challenges when the scope of 
direct election has increased and there has been the proliferation of political 
parties. Besides, as public housing issues have been one of the major concerns 
of society, news about or affiliated to it, for example, the related protest activities, 
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have received considerable attention from the press. This consistent news 
coverage provides a valuable source for documentary analysis. 
Apart from these, since the provision of public housing in Hong Kong 
was/is obviously a kind of collective consumption (Castells et al., 1991), the 
public housing movement here offers a good example to study how the state's 
decision to provide socially valued goods for its people led to the proliferation of 
concerning protest activities, and the various dynamics arising from the 
provision. 
Literature Review 
Literature concerning the housing movement of Hong Kong can be 
classified into two categories. The first category mainly delineated various 
features characterizing the early stage of the public housing movement (Lui and 
Kung, 1985; Fung, 1988; Wong, 1988; Cheung and Louie, 1991). The second 
category, on the other hand, discussed challenges faced by residents groups as a 
result of the democratization context (Leung, 1989; Lui, 1989; Kin, 1992, 
Kwok,1992). 
Literature of the first category tended to focus on the period from mid 
1970's to mid 1980's. They addressed about the pattern of the movement as 
well as factors conducive to its development. 
Pattern of the movement 
There was a steady increase in the number of housing conflict. During the 
period between 1976 and 1983，according to Lui and Kung (1985), at least ten 
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cases of conflict involving housing issues were recorded annually except 1979 
and 1983. Another research by Cheung and Louie (1991) also averred a stable 
increase in housing conflicts from the years of 1975 to 1986，except 1983. 
Among the 169 cases, the majority, 137 cases, concerned about the provision, 
allocation, management and the rent of public housing. 
A trend of intensification of housing conflicts was recognized. From 1975 
onwards, a housing conflict would bring about two or more events initiated by 
residents (Lui and Kung, 1985). Besides, joint-action from different estates 
became more probable after the formation of the People's Council on Public 
Housing Policies, and the period between 1980 and 83 were the heyday of joint-
action (Fung, 1990). 
With regard to the mode of action, the public housing movement has 
employed the campaign strategy (Wong, 1988). The movement has accepted 
the legitimacy of the government in distributing resources; what it intended to 
challenge was how such resources were allocated. According to Cheung and 
Louie (1991), protest and mass rally were more likely to be used in housing 
conflicts than other conflicts. 
Conducive Factors 
The flourish of the public housing movement since the mid 1970's was 
highly related to the policy that the Hong Kong Housing Authority was made 
financially autonomous (Lui and Kung, 1985). From 1977 onwards, the 
Housing Authority was not required to pay any premium for land granted by the 
government for building public housing. Loans from the Developmental Fund 
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were to be repaid over forty years, with an annual interest rate of 5%. Tenants 
had to be self-responsible for the maintaining and the operational costs of their 
estates. Surplus from rent was to be used to finance new dwellings. Because 
of this policy of self-financing, tenants in Mark II Estates---- estates that were 
poorly constructed and had a high maintaining cost, had to bear substantial rent 
increase but sub-standard infrastructure. Hence, their discontent towards the 
Housing Authority was accelerated, sowing the seed of collective action. 
The flourish was also germane to the land policy of the government, in 
which more accessible land, i.e., those in the urban region, were reserved for 
commercial uses and private housing, while new public estates and temporary 
resettlement areas were mainly constructed in the New territories, lacking 
adequate infrastructure. 
The dissatisfactions of tenants were expressed in non-institutionalized 
actions such as protests because there was no effective formal channel of 
participation and consultation. Most of the Mutual Aid Committees were co-
opted by the government. Beside, members in the Legislative Council were 
appointed by the govemor, the majority of which were with upper class 
background (Fung, 1990). 
Literature of the second category tended to focus on the period after the late 
1980's. They addressed about new problems faced by residents groups or the 
public housing movement associated with the progressive democratization 
process. One of them and also the most challenging problem, was the 
formation and development of political parties. 
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The emergency and proliferation of political parties have hindered the 
survival and development of most residents groups. When compared, the 
former were in a more advantageous position than the latter within the 
democratized context.(Lui, 1989; Kwok, 1992). It was because the most 
important aim of political parties were to sponsor their members for elections so 
that they could advise, criticize and occasionally block proposal put forward by 
the government through institutionalized means. Since members represented 
the party and used the name of the party to run for elections, the legitimacy of the 
party was confirmed when its members (of majority) became councillors or 
District Board members. Such legal legitimacy was conducive for mobilizing 
support and gaining resources. In addition, access to decision makers was also 
more likely and easier, that implied a greater chance of having real influence on 
official policies. On the other hand, resident groups might nominate their 
members for elections. However, even members were elected, the nature of 
resident groups stayed as before— they were still non-institutionalized and thus, 
lacking the legal legitimacy in the political arena, which made them more 
difficult to recruit members, strengthened organizational structure as well as 
influencing government policies effectively and efficiently. 
Aspects Neglected by the Literature 
The preceding literature help us to understand the public housing movement 
of Hong Kong. But certain key issues are not sufficiently attended. In the 
following, these key issues will be elaborated first. Then the research will argue 
that it is important to have a thorough analysis of the role of the state. This 
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analysis is particularly necessary with regard to the fact that sufficient attention 
was not given to this factor by the existing literature concerning about the public 
housing movement. 
The literature focused on the structural strains to account for the rapid 
emergency of housing conflicts. It was stated that the self-financing policy of 
the Housing Authority; the official land policy; and the non-existence of effective 
channel for mass participation and grievances redress; made collective action by 
tenants as the practical mean to voice out their demands. It was not to deny the 
significance of structural strains in explaining the development of the public 
housing movement. But such perspective ignores whether there have been any 
changes in the political environment that facilitated or induced the series of 
collective action, apart from discontents. Favourable political opportunities 
were crucial to the emergency and the development of a social movement. Such 
viewpoint was echoed in a statement of Tarrow (1994) which claims that: 
Movements are produced when political opportunities are broadened, when 
they demonstrate the existence of allies and when they reveal the vulnerability 
of opponents." (pg.23) 
The literature recognized the relatively advantageous position of political 
parties within the democratized context. However, they ignored the inner 
variations among them and therefore, did not point out which type of political 
party that has threatened residents groups most. Besides, the discussions 
remained in an abstract theoretical level and hence, did not illustrate how these 
two main groups actually competed with each other in the political arena. 
Moreover, since political parties in Hong Kong could never become the 
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governing party, all of them were similar to the opposition parties in Western 
democracy that mainly served the function of monitoring the government. 
Hence, it is tempting to ask why these opposition parties in the territory did not 
side with movement organizations to increase or enhance their leverage. This 
phenomenon seemed contrary to the analysis of Maguire (1995) who realizes 
that: 
Political interactions between movements and parties are particularly 
prevalent when parties are in opposition and are building social coalitions for 
electoral purpose. (1995:199) 
Some of the literaturfe (e.g., Cheung and Louie, 1991) only recorded the 
modes of collective action and counted their frequency without conceptualizing 
them for further analysis. With regard to this deficiency, the research proposes 
two dimensions— cadre-oriented vs. mass-oriented (they are to be explained in 
chapter four), to classify the collective action events, which undeniably, help the 
research to achieve analytical clarity and generate insightful information for 
analysis. 
Addressing the Role of the State 
Most importantly, the relationship between the state and the public housing 
movement was not sufficiently addressed. It was realized in some foreign 
literature (for example, Jenkins and Klandermans, 1995) that the state also 
exerted prominent influence on movement development and decline, apart from 
the availability of resources. 
The resource mobilization approach (for example, McCarthy and Zald, 1973 
and 1977)，based on the premise that grievances were relatively pervasive, 
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stressed on the availability of external support as the determining factor in 
movement formation and fall. Thus, research attention was given to whether 
sponsorship from church groups, foundations, organized labour, et al., accessed 
to potential movement participants. Jenkins and Perrows (1977), for instance, 
in their study of the American farm worker movement from 1946-1972, showed 
that insurgencies developed not from an aggregate rise in discontent but from a 
substantial increase in the level of resources available to support collective 
protest activities by the national political elites. 
However, evinced by Jenkins and Klandermans (1995), it was also 
necessary to focus on the role of the state, which should not be perceived as 
merely one of the factors contributing to the discontent of insurgents. It was 
because being the ultimate arbiter for the allocation of socially valued goods, the 
state was inevitably the target, sponsor and antagonist for social movements. 
Besides, being the organizer of the political system, the state shaped the 
relationship between social movements and the political representation system. 
According to the authors, the political representation system meant the 
institutionalized set of organizations including political parties, interest 
associations and various social institutions, that claimed to represent and 
aggregate the interests of various social interests. These groups enjoyed access 
to centers of political decision making and were, thus, members of the polity. 
As stated by the authors, the state and its political representation system 
constituted the political opportunities structure which were central to the 
emergency and the development of social movements. 
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Research Direction 
Time Scope of the Analysis 
The research covers the years from 1980 to 1995. It is because this long 
coverage enables the research not only to identify observable changes within the 
public housing movement, but also the dynamics of its political opportunities 
structure. In addition, the period witnessed several consequential and relevant 
changes: the inaugurations of direct elections; the structural transformation of the 
Housing Authority, and the proliferation of political parties, all of which are 
highly relevant to the development of the public housing movement. 
Methodology 
The methodology is mostly based on documentary analysis. Raw 
materials are collected mainly from content analysis of newspapers. The 
advantage of such method of data collection lies in the fact that it is easily 
accessible. In addition, the requirement of newspapers to offer lots of news 
articles each day allows even "less attractive" protest events to be paid attention 
to, which may not appear in other media, e.g., TV news report and magazines 
(Rucht and Ohlemacher, 1992). Newspaper clippings provided by the Catholics 
Communication Center and the Asia-Pacific Institute of the Chinese University 
of Hong Kong constitute the sources. Both of them satisfy the criteria of 
continuity---- they cover the entire period of study. In addition, a more 
complete picture of the collective action events concerning issues of public 
housing can be revealed. It is because the clippings contain reports from more 
than two newspapers (the ones published by the Catholics Communication 
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Center include six local newspapers). Though the selection of news reports are 
first subject to the judgement of those making the clippings, the danger of 
arbitrary selection is minimized for they were done by two different institutes. 
Every collective event is counted only once to avoid redundant counting. 
Two case studies of movement organizations are implemented in order to 
attain a more thorough understanding of the impact of political parties on these 
organizations. 
The selection, instead of arbitrary, is based on the consideration that one of 
them has maintained a close cooperative relationship with its allying political 
party, while the other has maintained a more distant relationship with its allying 
political party. Therefore, the impacts of political parties' policy and strategic 
orientations at these two resident groups can be compared and contrasted. 
Apart from the above, other documents such as the Legislative Council 
Proceedings, the Annual Reports of the Legislative Council, the Office of 
Members of Executive and Legislative Councils (OMELCO) and the Housing 
Authority are to be reviewed respectively. In depth interviews with past and 
present movement participants, as well as District Board members are also 
carried out. 
Content of the Research 
Chapter two will elaborate the theoretical framework of the research, i.e., 
the political opportunities structure. Chapter three will be a construction of 
empirical indexes for the various dimensions underlying the political 
opportunities structure. Chapter four will delineate the general configurations 
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of the collective actions concerning issues of public housing. Chapters five to 
eight will be an analysis of the dimensions, namely, the government's propensity 
of repression; the formal and the informal access for participants of the public 
housing movement; the policy and strategic orientations of the grass-root 
oriented political parties; and the change in the political alignment---- the 
protrusions of pro-China resident organizations. Chapter nine will be the 
concluding section in which the empirical and the theoretical significance of the 
research will be stated. 
The research will evince that there is a seemingly paradox concerning the 
impact of the political opportunities structure on the public housing movement 
from 1991-1995. On the one hand, the political opportunities structure 
facilitated the initiations of collective actions that were about public housing in 
general; on the other hand, it did not favour a certain form of collective action by 
the public housing movement in particular. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter, the concept, political opportunities structure, will be 
modified. The modifications, instead of disavowing its basic principles, attempt 
to establish a theoretical framework that will be more appropriate in analyzing 
the public housing movement within the Hong Kong context. 
The immediate section will be an elaboration of the concept. Then it will 
make explicit how the concept should be revised. Several analyses on 
movement-party relationship will be elaborated later. 
Elaborating Political Opportunities Structure 
Research on collective action have averred the importance of the "structure 
of political opportunities" in determining the fate and timing of social 
movements (e.g. McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1992, 1994). The research of 
McAdam (1982), for instance, illustrated how change in the attitude of the 
federal government towards riots, helped to account for the rise and the demise of 
the Civil Rights Movement. The analysis of Brockett (1991) also revealed how 
political systems have conditioned peasant mobilization in Central America. 
The concept was first adopted by Eisinger (1973) to account for variations 
of protest activities among forty-three American cities. A definition is offered 
by Brockett (1991:254) who perceives political opportunities structure as "the 
configuration of forces in a (potential or actual) group's political environment 
that influences that group's assertion of its political claim". 
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In the below, it will state why political opportunities must be differentiated 
from the domain of resources (McAdam, 1996). Then the dimensions 
comprising the political opportunities structure will be illustrated. 
Discerning Political Opportunities from Resources 
Political opportunities should not be made identical with resources. It 
seems that political opportunities are one of the many resources, playing a key 
role in the emergency and development of social movements. But such 
conceptualization of resources is overly inclusive and thus, "robs the concept of 
its analytic bite" (McAdam, 1996: 26). Resources and political opportunities 
should be narrowly defined so that their relative importance in social movements 
can be easier to access. 
Dimensions Comprising the Opportunities Structure 
Movement analysts (Brockett, 1991; Kriesi, 1995; McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 
1992, 1994) have specified the germane aspects that consist of a system's 
structure of political opportunities. In spite of terminological divergences, there 
is a fairly high level of consensus among their formulations. 
The first dimension is the relative openness or closure of the 
institutionalized political system to challengers, and whether the nature of the 
informal procedures in relation to them is exclusive or inclusive. 
The second dimension is the stability or instability of the political 
alignment. 
The third dimension is the presence or absence of elite allies. 
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The fourth dimension is the state's capacity and propensity for repression. 
Level of Openness of the Institutionalized Political System & Degree of 
Inclusiveness of the Informal Procedures 
This dimension refers to both the formal political institution and the 
prevailing strategies used by the state to deal with challengers. Behind this 
dimension is the notion that challengers are constrained not just by formal 
institutional structure, but also by the informal strategies, i.e., those unwritten but 
prevailing practices, typically employed by the authority with regard to them 
(Kriesi, 1995). A typology is provided by Kriesi (1995). 
Table 1. The General Settings for the Approach of Members towards Challengers 
Formal Institutional Structure 
Dominant Strategy Weak State Strong State 
Exclusive Formalistic inclusion Full exclusion 
-formal, but no informal， -neither formal nor informal 
facilitation of access; facilitation of access; 
strong repression strong repression 
-possibility of veto, but no -possibility of neither veto 
substantive concessions nor substantive concessions 
(Germany) (France) 
Inclusive Full procedure integration Informal cooptation 
-formal and informal -no formal, but informal, 
facilitation of access; facilitation of access 
weak repression weak repression 
-possibility of veto, but no -no possibility of veto, but 
substantial concessions substantial concessions 
(Switzerland) (Netherlands) 
Note. From "The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: 
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Its Impact on their Mobilization" by Hanspeter Kriesi, 1995, The Politics of 
Social Protest, p.l77. 
A strong state refers to the state in which the formal institutional structure is 
relatively closed--- there is no or little formal access to challengers, while a weak 
state is just the opposite. Exclusive strategies refers to the informal procedures 
and prevailing strategies with respect to challengers that are characterized by 
repression, confrontation and prolarization. Inclusive strategies, on the other 
hand, mean those tactics that are facilitative, cooperative and assimilative. 
According to the research of Kriesi (1995), the social movement sector in 
the weak, inclusive Swiss State was characterized by a very high aggregate level 
of mobilization and a very moderate action repertoire. Formal movement 
organizations tended to be strongly developed. The strong, exclusive French, 
on the contrary, possessed a lower overall level of mobilization than in the other 
countries analyzed. Besides, participation was heavily concentrated in 
unconventional forms, within which violence occurred relatively often. 
Netherlands and Germany were in the intermediate, with the former more 
resembled to the Swiss pattern while the latter came closer to the French pattern. 
Level of Stability of a System's Political Alignment 
This dimension is usually measured by electoral stability. In 60's United 
States, the Democrats' attempted to seek new sources of support to compensate 
for its declining electorate not only encouraged changes in voting behaviour but 
broadened political mobilization in general (Tarrow, 1994). Furthermore, 
instability of the political alignments could be caused or associated with large 
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scale upheavals occurring in a society, for example, revolution, which brought 
about abrupt changes in the political arena, leading to a rise of the political 
leverage of insurgent groups (McAdam, 1982). 
The Presence of Elite Allies 
The availability of elite allies is often caused by conflicts within and among 
such groups. It is because divisions among elites not only provide opportunities 
to resource-poor groups to engage in collective struggle, more importantly, some 
elites may side with insurgents to strike their opponent or to increase their 
bargaining power. In the 1970's and the 1980's, divisions between softliners 
and hardliners provided openings for opposition movements in Spain and Brazil 
(Tarrow, 1994). 
The State's Propensity & Capacity of Repression 
The dimension means the likelihood of movement activities to encounter 
repression. According to Brockett (1991), the intensity of repression was not 
directly related to the level of threat perceived by elites. Regimes and leaders 
varied both in their willingness to tolerate popular mobilization and their 
capability to respond with coercion instead. Capacity was a necessary 
precondition for repression. At the same time, the importance of the propensity 
to repress should not be underestimated. The research of Porta (1996) showed 
that protest policing did affect the form of movement activities. More tolerant, 
selective and softer police behaviour favoured protest. More repressive, diffuse 
and hard technique of policing discouraged the mass and peaceful protest but 
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fuelled the more radical fringe. 
Modifications 
The modifications of the "political opportunities structure" concept are 
necessary for two reasons. First, the concept has been formulated particularly 
on American and Western European experiences, for example, the cases of 
Tarrow (1994)，Mcadam(1982), Kriesi (1995). Second, the types of the social 
movements analyzed also varied. Kriesi (1995), for instance, focused on the 
new social movements including the peace movement, the ecology movement, 
the feminist movement, etc., while Brockett (1991) put peasant protests as his 
units of analysis. Still others like Oxhorn (1994) who concentrated on popular 
mobilizations by the poor urban dwellers. Hence, an unconditional acceptance 
of the four previously stated dimensions to understand the public housing 
movement of Hong Kong would undeniably suffer from being ahistorical, i.e., 
fails to pay attention to the particularities of Hong Kong and the particularities of 
its public housing movement. 
The modifications suggest that the dimension referring to the level of 
stability of a system's political alignment should be revised. In addition, the 
dimension that concerns about the presence of elite allies is inappropriate to 
apply to the political context of Hong Kong. Furthermore, only the propensity 
of repression needs analysis with regard to the dimension of the state's 
propensity and capacity of repression. A new dimension, i.e., the policy and 
strategic orientations of political parties, should be established. 
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Revising the Dimension about the Level of Stability of a System's Political 
Alignment 
The dimension, i.e., the level of stability of a system's political alignment 
needs to be revised in analyzing the political context of Hong Kong. According 
to this dimension, instability of the political alignment facilitates movement 
mobilization either by seriously undermining the existing power structure or by 
increasing the political leverage of a single insurgent group. The first condition 
is always a result of large-scale political turbulence, for example, revolutions, 
wars within and among nations. The second condition is usually a result of 
electoral instability, which means the employment of a more friendly attitude by 
political parties towards movement organizations or side with them in order to 
become the ruling party (Tarrow, 1992). 
Problems of inappropriateness emerge because these conditions have not 
and cannot happen in Hong Kong. The political context has been well known 
for its unusual stability/ Even three large-scale riots occurred in 1956, 1966 and 
1967, they could not shaken the political alignment of Hong Kong. In addition, 
popular election had not existed until 1982 with the introduction of the District 
Board Election, and the first political party was established only in 1989.2 
Albeit political parties can now send their members for elections, none of them 
can become the ruling party given the executive-leading nature of the formal 
political institution. Thus, the kind of electoral stability has been simply absent 
in Hong Kong. 
Hence, instead of referring to any changes associated with large-scale 
turbulence or electoral stability, it is much more appropriate to understand this 
dimension as meaning any changes in the political alignment that were brought 
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about by the transfer of sovereignty to China. The research will, thus, focus on 
whether the transition would lead to any change in the power configuration of the 
public housing movement from 1991-1995. Attention will be paid on the 
phenomenon that if the transition led to the rise of pro-China resident groups, for 
the political change might increase the efficacy of these leftist forces, and might 
encourage them to take a more active role to accompany the transition. 
Inappropriateness of the Dimension of the Presence of Elite Allies 
Most studies on political opportunities structure have realized the 
availability of elite support as one of the central determinants in movement or 
protest mobilizations (e.g., Tarrow, 1992, 1994). It is said that division among 
them is crucial to the development of a social movement for some of them may 
side with movement organizations to strike their opponents. Nevertheless, the 
groups of actors that should be considered as elites and the type of support they 
provide are never addressed explicitly. 
In some instances, elites were referred to the ruling party or members of the 
polity (Tarrow, 1994; McAdam, 1996) while in others, elites consisted of 
religious workers, union organizers, revolutionary guerrillas and intellectuals 
(Brockett, 1991). 
If the first category is adopted, problem of inappropriateness occurs. There 
was no possibility of elite division in the political system of Hong Kong. It was 
because the political elites here, i.e., the senior civil servants, were obliged to 
maintain a united front on government policies (Lau, 1982). Even elites are 
defmed as those unofficial political actors that are responsible for programs of 
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interest to the social movement, i.e., unofficial members of the Hong Kong 
Housing Authority, according to the preliminary analysis of the research, there 
was little division among them. It was because the unofficial members were 
directly appointed by the government and most of them had similar business and 
professional backgrounds. Furthermore, though some of the member showed 
their disagreement against some of the policies of the authority, they were 
partisan members who were just expressing the stance of their respective political 
parties, which will be analyzed thoroughly in the new dimension, i.e., the policy 
and strategic orientations of political parties. If non-official Legislative 
Councillors are considered, also revealed by the preliminary analysis, no non-
official-member motions concerning issues of public housing were put forward 
from 1980-1990. After the introduction of direct election to the council since 
1991，all non-officials motions that dealt with public-housing matters were either 
put forward or amended by representatives from the grass-root oriented political 
parties, which will be analyzed in the new dimension as well. 
On the other hand, if elites are defined according to the second category, the 
support they offer would mainly be the availability of manpower, material 
resources and knowledge given the fact that they have been also excluded from 
the formal institution. But such kind of support should be considered as 
"resources" not "political opportunities". 
Focusing on the State's Propensity of Repression 
With regard to the dimension concerning the state's propensity and capacity 
of repression, the research will focus only on the state's propensity of repression. 
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It is not to disavow the importance of the capacity of repression. However, one 
should recognize the fact that the government of Hong Kong has always 
possessed the adequate and the necessary capacity of repression. There was 
remarkable expansion of the police in the last two decades. The Hong Kong 
Police Force has been one of the largest police force in the world in both absolute 
numbers and proportion to the size of the population (Traver and Gaylord, 1991). 
Political Parties' Policy and Strategic Orientations 
The inclusion of this dimension to study the public housing movement of 
Hong Kong is necessary. Literature (for instance, Kwok, 1992) have stated that 
the emergency and the development of political parties have hindered the 
survival and further development of most resident groups. 
The particularities of Hong Kong's political context require one to treat 
political parties' orientations as an individual dimension, rather than 
incorporating it to other dimensions of the opportunities structure. This is due 
to the fact that any political party could/can never become the governing party in 
Hong Kong (they would/will never be the government). What they could/can 
do is through their elected members, to criticize, propose and occasionally block 
suggestions put forward by the government. Thus, it is better to regard them 
as an individual entity so as to understand how they interact with the government 
and movement organizations. 
The below section will demonstrate that the policy and strategic orientations 
of the political parties helped to determine the fate of the social movements----
when the political parties' policy orientation was similar to the movement 
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organizations and decided to cooperate with them (usually in the short run), the 
social movements' situation tended to be more favourable. However, when the 
political parties' orientation changed from cooperative to non-cooperative, the 
social movements did face a bleak future. 
Political parties and Social Movements 
Certain research (e.g., Maguire, 1995; Oxhorn, 1994) have put the 
relationship between political parties and social movements as their focus of 
concern. Despite the cases' diversities such as different political systems, the 
studies converged in their findings that social movements, in the long run, tended 
to be either replaced or displaced by political parties. 
Anti-Nuclear Movements in Britain and Italy 
Claimed by Maguire (1995: 202), a political party was more inclined to ally 
with a protest movement when it was in opposition status: 
Opposition parties lack the necessary power within state institutions to 
implement their policies, and they seek support from politically relevant 
constituencies in civil society in order to achieve it. To the extent that a 
protest movement can help serve that purpose, a political party will be 
interested in establishing contact. 
However, their cooperation, rather than being stable, was likely to be 
ephemeral. A protest movement was very likely to be abandoned by a political 
party once the former was perceived as an electoral liability. In another 
instance, a movement was so dependent on a party that the party's fortune 
becomes its own fortune. 
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In Britain, the Labour Party sought to ally with the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND), a leading peace movement organization, by adopting the 
notion of unilateral disarmament to its official manifesto in order to attract 
middle-class radicals. But with the changed international environment and the 
rapid decline of the campaign, alongside with a more favourable internal political 
context (for example, the party's leadership became more united), the Labour 
Party finally abandoned its commitment to unilateralism. 
To the campaign, such abandon meant the closing of its political 
opportunities for there was now little to separate the defense policies of Britain's 
political elites. Even during the "honey-moon" period, the campaign was so 
dominated by its Labour-Party activists that its strategies and organizational 
structure were very different from its counterparts in other Westem European 
nations. 
In Italy, the majority of peace groups were either assisted or set up by the 
Italian Communist Party (PCI) and its Youth Federation (FGCI), which (the 
peace groups) obtained their offices and other resources from local PCI. Since 
the peace groups were so relied on the PCI, they failed to establish an 
independent central organization, and thus, were unable to unite intemally plus 
launching effective protest actions directed to the government. The crux was 
that this over-reliance made the movement's political opportunities structure 
identical and as bleak as those of the PCI. Because of its continued exclusion 
from government, the PCI simply lacked the policy resources, i.e., the capacity to 
influence and determine policy on certain issues at state level, to grant the 
movement success. 
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Popular Mobilization in Chile 
The research of Oxhorn (1994) evinced that the cooperative relationship 
between political parties and social movements was evanescent in Chile, too. 
From May 1983 to mid 1986，social mobilizations initiated and participated 
by poor urban dwellers formed the core of the opposition's strategy for securing 
a transition to democracy. A Comando Unitario de Pobladores (CPU) was 
established to direct the action of hundreds of popular organizations. Its extent 
of representation was undermined by the decision of the opposition parties to 
exclude systematically the vast majority of non-party-member dwellers. The 
CPU still enjoyed considerable freedom of action yet. But it was dismantled by 
the opposition parties when the democratization process was implemented by the 
military government, for the latter feared that radical actions might deter middle-
class support and created excuse to the oppressing regime to throttle the still 
fragile democracy. As a result, the popular sectors as a collective actor were 
progressively marginalized from Chile's transition process. The poor urban 
dwellers participated in massive numbers but only confined to registering to vote 
and voting. The initiative for popular mobilization now came from the political 
parties on the basis of general appeals for a return to democracy. 
What can be inferred from the above is that the position of political parties 
towards movement organizations is one of utilitarianistic. A political party will 
not be demure to split with a movement organization when the latter is perceived 
as an electoral liability. 
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Concluding the Theoretical Framework 
The research will analyze the dynamics of the four dimensions--— (i) the 
formal institutional structure, and the informal procedures used by the 
government to deal with challengers; (ii) level of stability of the political 
alignment; (iii) the state's propensity of repression; (iv) the policy and strategic 
orientations of political parties. Besides, it will also analyze how they have 
affected the public housing movement of Hong Kong. 
Nevertheless, it possesses no connotation to mean that other aspects such as 
resources and framing of the environment are trivial to understand the movement. 
It is for the sakes of conceptual clarity and the scope of the research, only the 
factor of political opportunities will be analyzed. It is believed that by 
concentrating on a factor as complex and as board as the political opportunities 
structure, fecund results will certainly be generated. 
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Notes 
1. Lau's Book, "Politics and Society in Hong Kong" (1982) provides a detailed 
discussion of the phenomenon. 
2. The United Democrats of Hong Kong was the first organization to proclaim 
itself as a political party. 
/ 
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Chapter 3 
Operationalization of the Theoretical Framework 
Having elaborated the theoretical framework, this chapter will concentrate 
on the construction of empirical indexes for the four dimensions. The 
construction is of utmost significant because it can bridge the gap between 
abstract theory and empirical analysis. 
But before proceeding to elaborate the above, there are matters needed to be 
addressed, which concern about the operationalization of movement 
organizations and non-institutionalized action types. 
Operationalize Movement Organizations 
In this research, movement organizations are operationalized as those 
i 
organizations that should fulfill the entire below criterion: 丨 
I I 
(i). they are established to promote and protect interests of public housing j il 
j! tenants; ！ 
(ii). they concentrate on non-institutionalized action types to achieve and express 
their demands; 
(iii).they are not formed by the government (non-government organizations). 
According to the second criteria, political parties are excluded for their 
major aim is to establish leverage by institutionalized means, i.e., elections, even 
though they sometimes resought to non-institutionalized ones like sit-ins and 
mass demonstrations. According to the third criteria, Mutual Aid Committees 
(MAC) are not regarded as movement organizations as well. It is because these 
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tenant-organizations are formed by the District Office and meet regularly with 
government departments particularly the Housing Offices in their own estates. 
Thus, they resemble more to lobbying groups rather than movement 
organizations. Movement organizations, as defined in the research, consisted 
chiefly of resident groups that were established between mid 70's to mid 80's 
well before the emergency and proliferation of political parties, and usually 
formed with the help of social workers or activists. Undoubtedly, some resident 
groups functioned mainly as providers of social and recreational services. They 
were, thus, not regarded as the movement organizations. Nevertheless, the term 
movement organization will be used interchangeably with the term resident 
group in the research unless specified. In addition, despite of the fact that 
political parties and the Mutual Aid Committees should not be classified as 
organizations of the public housing movement, it is not to deny interactions 
among them. Instead, one should not expect their interplay to be unordinary 
given their similar concerns. , 
Operationalize Non-Institutionalized Action Types 
One of the definitional criteria of movement organizations is whether "they 
concentrate on non-institutionalized action types to achieve and express their 
demands"; hence, what these action types actually mean or refer to should 
deserve serious attention. 
In this research, they are operationalized as "modes of collective action that 
proclaim their demands or concems outside formal channels of conflict 
resolutions". Accordingly, for example, instead of visiting the Omelco Office 
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to make complaints, grievances are expressed collectively through processions. 
Such non-institutionalized action types encompass a series of forms. In the 
research, non-institutionalized action types include the followings: 
(i) press conference, 
(ii) petition to the Housing Authority, 
(iii) petition to the Governor, 
(iv) protest and mass rally (procession), 
(v) public meeting, 
(vi) sit-in. 
On the other hand, institutionalized action types include the followings: 
(i) closed door meeting with government officials 
(ii) closed door meeting with members of the Housing Authority 
(iii) petition to the OMELCO i.e., closed door meeting with Legislative 
Councillors in the OMELCO Office.� 
Operationalize the Dimensions 
Level of Openness of the Formal Political Structure, and Level of Inclusiveness 
of the Informal Procedures 
The dimension refers to the relative openness or closure of the 
institutionalized political system to challengers, and whether the nature of the 
informal procedures in relation to them is exclusive or inclusive. Though these 
two components jointly affect movement development, they require individual 
operationalization for the sake of conceptual and analytical clarifications. 
The first component, i.e., the level of openness of the institutionalized 
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political system to challengers, is operationalized as "the level of formal access 
for public housing movement participants". Owing to the specific context of 
Hong Kong, the research will look at the formal institution, and the structure of 
the Housing Authority respectively. The former, i.e. the openness of the formal 
constitution, is revealed by the following indexes: 
(i) if the challengers, i.e., participants of the public housing movement, could 
send their representatives for elections so that the latter may become members 
of the formal political structure; 
(ii) if there was any formal official channel for the movement participants to 
express their demands or grievances. 
The latter, i.e. the extent that the Housing Authority is subject to public 
scrutiny, is revealed by the following indexes: 
(i)whether the Housing Authority consisted of any elected members; 
(ii)which body(ies) that the Housing Authority was directly accountable, and in 
turn, the extent such body(ies) were subject to public monitoring. 
Sources for Analyzing the Indexes 
Literature and government documents concerning the constitutional features 
of Hong Kong are revealed so that a delineation of the development of the formal 
political structure can be achieved. Besides, the Annul Reports of the Housing 
Authority are studied. 
The second component concems about the nature of the informal procedures, 
i.e., those unwritten but prevailing practices, when dealing with challengers. 
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This component is operationalized as "the level of informal access for public 
housing movement participants". It is revealed and measured by the following 
index: 
(i). the frequency that representatives of the Housing Authority or those from 
relevant government departments engaged in meetings with movement 
participants to discuss matters of concern. 
Sources for Analyzing the Index 
Content analysis of newspapers is employed when analyzing the index. 
Cases involving closed-door discussions with representatives from the Housing 
Authority or relevant government officials; as well as mass meetings that were 
held by the movement organizations, which involved the attendance of these 
representatives, were counted. 
The Level of Stability of A System's Political Alignment 
Instead of focusing on any associated political effects brought by electoral 
instability or large-scale turbulence, the research will pay attention to changes in 
the power configuration of the public housing movement as a result of the 
transfer of sovereignty to China. The dimension is operationalized as "whether 
there was the protrusions of pro-China resident groups". It is revealed by the 
following indexes: 
(i) whether there were any pro-China resident groups that took part in the 
initiations ofthe collective action events during the period of study; 
(ii) whether there were any pro-China resident groups that participated in other 
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sectors related to the public housing movement sector, for example, the 
formal institution. 
Sources for understanding the Index 
Content analysis of newspaper is implemented. Election information are 
also analyzed. Moreover, in order to achieve deeper understanding of these 
groups, in-depth interviews are conducted. 
Political Parties' Policy and Strategic Orientations 
The research defines a political party as: 
an institution with a recognizable doctrine, cohesive nationwide organization, 
continuity in structure and leadership, capability to have candidates elected in 
elections or even to govern, in brief, as similar to the parties we know in the 
Western democracies (Louie, 1991:57). 
Among them, only those that are more grass-root oriented are chosen for 
analysis because they have similar policy concerns and constituents with the 
movement organizations. Empirically, they include the Democratic Party and, 
the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood. The 
former bodies of the Democratic Party, i.e., the Hong Kong United Democrats 
and the Meeting Point (despite of its middle class image, it did reflect the opinion 
of the grass-root in public-housing issues), are also put into this category. 
The former component of the dimension---- political parties' policy 
orientation, is operationalized as the grass-root oriented political parties stance on 
public housing policy. 
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Sources for Understanding the Component 
The policy statements of these political parties are studied. Those 
concerning public housing are then analyzed. 
On the other hand, the latter component: political parties strategic 
orientation, is operationalized as the major type of constituents that the political 
parties target at and, tactics used by them to achieve their claims. The political 
parties' strategic orientation is revealed by the below indexes: 
(i) the socio-economic status of the majority of their constituents in terms of 
the types of housing they live; 
(ii) the frequency the members of these parties have put forward questions and 
motions about public housing policies during meetings of the Legislative 
Council, and the content of these motions and questions; 
(iii). the frequency of collective action on issues of public housing that were 
mobilized by political parties and the demands of these actions. 
Sources for Analyzing the Indexes 
To analyze the first index, the reports of the District Boards are reviewed to 
understand the major type of residential area among various constituencies. 
Emphasis is placed on those constituencies in which the grass-root oriented 
parties have cast their participation. To analyze the second index, the annual 
reports of the Legislative Council and the Legislative Council Proceedings are 
reviewed. Content analysis of newspapers is used to understand the third index. 
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Cases Studies 
Apart from the above indexes, case studies are also be implemented, with an 
attempt to achieve a more in-depth knowledge of the influence of this dimension 
on the movement organizations. Two resident groups are chosen as the units of 
analysis so as to compare and contrast two different relationship pattems between 
them and the political parties. The selection is not arbitrary but is based on the 
following considerations: 
(i) one of them was established well before the proliferation of political parties 
or groups while another one was formed with the assistance of a political 
party; 
(ii) one of them has maintained a very close relationship with the allying political 
party and another has maintained its independence from the allying political 
party. 
Methodology of the Case Studies 
Structured, open-ended interviews with the organization's major 
participants and members of the related political parties are done. 
The State's Propensity of Repression 
To understand this dimension, the Public Order Ordinance is analyzed. It 
was because the ordinance reflected the position or the level of tolerance of the 
Hong Kong Government towards collective action particularly those non-
institutionalized ones. Since the focus of the research is on the collective action 
events, only the parts of the ordinance concerning about the freedom of assembly 
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are to be analyzed. 
The state's propensity of repression is further operationalized into "the 
police handling of resident-group activities". The concerned activities were 
only those non-institutionalized, planned actions with explicit demands on issues 
of public housing, which took place in open setting, for instance, sit-ins and 
processions.^ 
The operationalization is based on the fact that the Royal Hong Kong Police 
Force is part of the government apparatus, whose function is the maintenance of 
internal order and law. The crux is that it is the legitimate entity entitling to 
employ force whenever necessary, and also is the government body directly 
encountering and dealing with protestors. Hence, the ways the police handles 
protest events actually reflect or represent the ways the Hong Kong government 
handles protest events. In other words, the police's responses to protests 
equates with the official attitudes towards protests. 
Apart from its validity, the above indicator possesses other advantages. It 
is easier to observe. One can understand how protesters were tackled through 
content-analysis of news reports. Besides, as proclaimed by Porta (1996), the 
police handling events had a direct impact on social movements: it did affect the 
form of protest in Germany and in Italy. 
Several indexes will be employed to reflect how the police have handled 
protest activities. They are: 
(i). whether repression from police was resulted, i.e., whether force has been 
employed by the police; 
(ii). the type(s) of protest behaviour that result in police repression; 
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(iii).the timing of police repression; 
(iv).the degree of force involved; 
(V). the reason(s) of repression; 
Sources for Analyzing the Indexes 
Content-analysis of newspapers is implemented. In addition, interviews 
with movement participants are also carried out in order to achieve a more 
complete picture. 
Conclusion 
Instead of proceeding to an immediate analysis of the above dimensions in 
the next chapter, the research will expose the general configurations of the 
collective action events that concerned about issues of public housing estates. 
The analysis will undeniably, provide fecund information for further analysis. 
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Notes 
1. It is believed that activities taking place in close-setting, for example, press 
conference, were not likely to be confrontational, and hence, unlikely to arouse or 
result in repression by the police. 
2. The fall name of the OMELCO was known as the Office of Members of 
Executive and Legislative Councils. Every member of the Legislative Council 
was required to take his/her turn to be on duty at the office of the OMELCO to 
receive complaints or policy suggestions from petitioning citizens. 
/ 
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Chapter 4 
General Configurations of the Collective Action Events Concerning 
Issues of Public Housing Estates 
Instances of collective action that occurred between 1980-1995 are recorded 
and analyzed. Apart from their contribution of delineating the general 
developmental trends of the public housing movements, the selected cases also 
function as the units of analysis for the indexes depending on content analysis of 
newspapers. 
The collective action events chosen must satisfy two conditions. They are: 
(i) the case must be recorded in newspapers with explicit action form(s); latent 
action such as "letters to the editor" are not considered; 
(ii) the case must bear identifiable and concrete claim(s) or demand(s). 
Signature campaigns and surveys are not counted as collective action events 
here. It was because their launchings were actually one of the preparatory 
processes for the initiation of a specific collective action event---- they were used 
to collect mass opinions before the holdings of protests, press conferences, mass 
meetings and other collective actions; or they were used to enhance the 
credibility of the demands that were proclaimed during the collective action 
events. Hence, they should not be counted to avoid the danger of double 
counting. 
In the below sections, attentions are paid on the collective action events that 
were initiated by resident groups and by the grass-root oriented political parties 
respectively. 
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Total Number of the Collective Action Events 
The annual number of the collective action events was quite stable from 
1980-1990，except for the consecutive years of 1985-1986. An extra-ordinarily 
high amount of cases were recorded in these two years as the majority of which 
were responses opposing the Green Paper on Housing Subsidy and the adoption 
of a new rent policy by the Housing Authority. A mass meeting involving more 
than 600 tenants has been once held to proclaim against the Green Paper on 
Public Housing Subsidy, for instance. 
On the other hand, a rising trend can be seen from 1991-1995 (except 1992 
with a slight drop of three instances). In addition, this period was characterized 
by a high annual number of cases. These last five years, altogether, accounted 
for 58% of the total number of collective action events. 
Figure 1. Total Number of the Collective Action Events / 
Year Number of Cases Percentage 
~ ~ ^ 7 3.8%~~ 
81 1 0.5% 
82 5 2.7% 
83 6 3.3% 
84 4 2.2% 
85 17 9.3% 
86 21 11.5% 
87 6 3.3% 
88 3 1.6% 
89 2 1.1% 
90 6 3.3% 
91 16 8.8% 
92 13 7.1% 
93 20 11% 
94 26 14.3% 
95 29 15.9% 
Total m 100% 
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^^te. Combined by the author from newspapers clippings provided by the 
Catholics Communication Center and the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies. 
Number of the Collective Action Events Initiated by Resident Groups 
Even events involving political parties and their joint action with resident 
groups are not counted (these action types emerged just from 1991)，similar 
trends like the ones above are observed. These mean that there was a stable 
increase from 1991-1995; more significantly, during this period, the number of 
cases per year was higher than the annual number of cases from 1980-1990 (not 
including 1985, 1986 and 1992). These last five years, when put together, 
occupied more than one-third of the total amount within the period of study 
(36.7%). In 1991, nine instances of press conferences were recorded, for 
example. In one of the instances, opinions about the sale of public housing 
units were expressed. 
Figure 2. Number of the Collective Action Events Initiated by 
Resident Groups 
Year Number of Cases Percentage 
~ m 7 4 7 ^ ~ ~ 
81 1 0.7% 
82 5 3.4% 
83 6 4.1% 
84 4 2.8% 
85 17 11.7% 
86 21 14.5% 
87 6 2.1% 
88 3 1.6% 
89 2 1.1% 
90 6 3.3% 
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~ ^ I l 4 T j % “ 
92 7 3.8% 
93 10 5.5% 
94 15 8.2% 
95 21 11.5% 
Total 1 ^ 100% 
Note. Combined by the author from newspapers clippings provided by the 
Catholics Communication Center and the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies. 
Number of the Collective Action Events Involving Joint Action by Resident 
Groups and Political Parties 
This category of action only occupied a small portion. Only seven 
instances are recorded within the period. Besides, a declining trend can be 
revealed. The annual number of occurrence dropped from three to one cases 
from 1992-1993. In 1992, for example, a political party and a resident group 
joined together to protest against the double-rent policy by staging a sit-in 
/ 
outside the Housing Authority^. 
Figure 3. Number of the Collective Action Events Involving Joint 
Action by Political Parties and Resident Groups 
Year Number of Cases Percentage 
92 3 42.9%~" 
93 2 28.6% 
94 1 14.3% 
95 1 14.3% 
Total 7 100% 
Note. Combined by the author from newspapers clippings provided by the 
Catholics Communication Center and the Hong Kong histitute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies. 
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Number of Collective Action Events Initiated by the Political Parties 
Here appeared a slightly rising trend (except the year of 1994 with a slight 
drop of 3 instances). However, it should be noted that the political parties had 
fewer proclivities to engage in collective action as resident groups did. Not 
more than four cases were recorded each year. In 1991’ a mass demonstration 
was organized by a political party, in which more than 400 tenants from 20 
housing estates participated. 
Figure 4 Number of Collective Action Events Initiated by Political 
Parties 
Year Number of Cases Percentage 
~~^I 2 Wo 
92 
93 6 24% 
94 10 40% 
95 7 28% 
Total ^ 100% 
Note. Combined by the author from newspapers clippings provided by the 
Catholics Communication Center and the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies. 
Collective Action Events Initiated by Resident Groups—Cadre-Oriented or 
Mass-Oriented 
It was ratified in the Public Order Amendment 1980 Ordinance that 
processions involving less than 20 participants were not required to license. 
Accordingly, cadre-oriented collective action events are defined as those events 
that involved not more than 20 participants while mass-oriented collective action 
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events referred to as those that possessed more than 20 participants. Cases like 
closed-door meetings and press conference were usually cadre-oriented while 
cases like protest and mass rally were usually mass-oriented (but this was not 
necessarily the case). More significantly, what this distinction implies is the 
mobilization capacity of the organization(s) that held the event. It can be 
inferred that events that were mass-oriented requiring greater mobilization effort 
and thus, higher mobilization capacity.; 
The collective action events that were initiated by resident groups had an 
obvious trend of being cadre-oriented, with the exception of the years of 1980， 
1984，1985, 1986 and 1992. In 1994，for example, eleven of the cases involved 
less than 20 participants while only four of them involved more than 20 
participants. 
Figure 5 Collective Actions Initiated by Resident Groups---Cadre-
Oriented (CO) or Mass-Oriented (MO) 
Year Number of CO Number of MO Total Number 
" 8 0 2 ^ 2 ^ ) 5 0 m 7(100%)~~ 
81 1(100%) 1(100%) 
82 4(80%) 1(20%) 5(100%) 
83 5(83%) 1(17%) 6(100%) 
84 2(50%) 2(50%) 4(100%) 
85 5(29%) 12(71%) 17(100%) 
86 9(43%) 12(57%) 21(100%) 
87 4(67%) 2(33%) 6(100%) 
88 2(67%) 1(33%) 3(100%) 
89 3(100%) 3(100%) 
90 5(83%) 1(17%) 6(100%) 
91 10(71%) 4(29%) 14(100%) 
92 5(50%) 5(50%) 10(100%) 
93 9(69%) 3(31%) 12(100%) 
94 11(73%) 4(27%) 15(100%) 
95 12(57%) 9(43%) 21(100%) 
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Nqte. Combined by the author from newspapers clippings provided by the 
Catholics Communication Center and the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies. 
Collective Action Events Initiated by Political Parties---Cadre-Oriented or Mass-
Oriented 
The collective action events initiated by the political parties were dominated 
by those of cadre-oriented. They were more likely to initiate cadre-oriented 
action than resident groups. Except for the year of 1991 (it actually had a total 
of two events, one was cadre-oriented and another was mass-oriented), the annual 
percentage of the mass-oriented event never exceeded 30 %. In 1993，for 
example, a closed door meeting with the chairperson was held to discuss the 
financial arrangement of the Housing Authority. 
Figure 6 Collective Actions Initiated by Political Parties---Cadre-
Oriented (CO) or Mass-Oriented (MO) 
^Year Number of CO Number of MO Total Number 
~~^l U 5 W K 5 ^ 2 ( 1 0 0 % ) “ 
92 
93 5(83%) 1(17%) 6(100%) 
94 8(80%) 2(20%) 10(100%) 
95 5(71%) 2(29%) 7(100%) 
Note. Combined by the author from newspapers clippings provided by the 
Catholics Communication Center and the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies. 
Collective Action Events Initiated by Resident Groups—L:istitutionalized or 
Non-Institutionalized 
As stated in the previous chapter, non-institutionalized actions referred to 
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those action modes of which demands were not expressed through formal 
channels of grievances redressed. The fact that which type of collective action 
was dominant not only reflected the average attitudes of the movement 
organizations towards the formal political system, but also whether their 
legitimacy was confirmed by the state. 
Resident groups were more likely to employ non-institutionalized modes of 
collective action. Only in the years of 1980，1981，1982，1987 and 1988 did the 
number of institutionalized collective action outnumbered those of non-
institutionalized. In the 90's, three cases involving direct confrontations with 
the police were recorded, which will be stated in chapter four. 
Figure 7. Collective Actions Initiated by Resident Groups---
Institutionalized (I) or Non-Institutionalized (NI) 
Year No. of I Action No. of NI Action Total No. 
~ m 7(100%) 7(100%) 
81 1(100%) 1(100%) 
2 3(60%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 
83 1(20%) 4(80%) 5(100%) 
84 4(100%) 4(100%) 
85 2(12%) 15(88%) 17(100%) 
86 6(29%) 15(71%) 21(100%) 
87 4(67%) 2(33%) 6(100%) 
88 2(67%) 1(33%) 3(100%) 
89 1(50%) 1(50%) 2(100%) 
90 1(17%) 5(83%) 6(100%) 
91 1(7%) 13(93%) 14(100%) 
92 1(10%) 9(90%) 10(100%) 
93 (25%) 9(75%) 12(100%) 
94 (33%) 10(67%) 15(100%) 
95 (19%) 17(81%) 21(100%) 
Note. Combined by the author from newspapers clippings provided by the 
Catholics Communication Center and the Hong Kong L:istitute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies. 
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Collective Action Events Initiated by Political Parties—Institutionalized or Non-
Institutionalized 
Contrary to resident groups, the political parties were more inclined to 
engage in institutionalized modes of collective action. In 1995, four cases 
concerned about closed-door discussions with representatives from the Housing 
Authority and relevant government officials, were recorded, and one of them 
opposed about the income and property surveillance of tenants. Another of 
them concerned about fastening the pace of redevelopment. 
Figure 8. Collective Actions Initiated by the Political Parties---
Institutionalized (I) or Non-Institutionalized (NI) 
Year No. of I Action No. of NI Action Total No. 
~ l a 2(100%) 2(100%) 
92 
93 3(50%) 3(50%) 6(100%) 
94 5(50%) 5(50%) 10(100%) 
95 4(57%) 3(43%) 7(100%) 
Note. Combined by the author from newspapers clippings provided by the 
Catholics Communication Center and the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies. 
taplications of the Configurations 
A general understanding of the territory's public housing movement is 
accorded by the various trends delineated above. More significantly, such 
trends also provide implications for further analysis. 
Figure 1 shows that there was the flourish of the collective action events 
from 1991-1995. In addition, contrary to the commonly held belief or some 
literature (e.g., Kwok, 1992), the public housing movement or resident-group 
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activities, during the same period, were far from declining as expressed in the 
annual and the total number of the collective action events shown in figure 2. 
Another striking implication from the figures 2 and 3 is that in terms of the 
amount of the instances initiated, k seems that the proliferation of political 
parties has not posed any severe threat to the movement organizations or resident 
groups. It was because political parties tended to show less eagerness in 
initiating collective actions. 
In the following chapters, the research will explain that the various 
dimensions of the political opportunities structure helped to account for the rising 
trend of collective actions from 1991-1995 and the relatively large annual 
number of cases during the same period. It will also demonstrate that the 
political opportunities structure facilitated the launchings of collective action 
concerning public-housing issues in general, but not favoured the initiations of 
mass-oriented collective action by the public housing movement in particular. 
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Notes 
1 It should be cautious that not all the instances of collective action were 
initiated by the movement organizations. The research has realized this fact 
when the processes of coding and analysis were implemented. 
2 Officially known as the Housing Subsidy Policy, the double-rent policy 
began to implement in 1987. According to the policy, a double of the original 
rent must be paid by households whose income exceed twice of the income limit 
specified in the public-housing waiting list. It is expected that tenant having to 
pay the double rent (they are classified as "well-off households，，）will move out 
of their rental units and thus, shortened the average time of waiting for those on 
the waiting list. 
3. Implied by this distinction is the proposition that, part from the difference in 
the size of participants, in a cadre-oriented event, only organizers and staff of a 
movement organization(s) were involved; on the other hand, in a mass-oriented 
event, not just the above people but other affected individuals would also cast ^ 
1 
their participation. Albeit this proposition cannot be verified by the news report, 
it was confirmed by our interviewees as the typical situation. 
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Chapter 5 
The Hong Kong Government's Propensity of Repression 
The Public Order (Amendment) Bill to loosen control over assemblies and 
processions was finally passed by the Legislative Council on 19^ July, 1995. 
However, owing to its late passage, the ordinance has exerted almost no 
influence even in the year of 1995�Therefore, it can be said that there was no 
substantial relaxation of the Public Order Ordinance before or during 1991-1995 
to account for the period's large amount of collective action events. 
Nevertheless, it can still be seen that during the entire period of study (1980-
1995)，the attitude of the government as revealed from the Public Order 
(Amendment) Ordinance 1980 and the police handling of the protest events, 
though not explicitly encouraged the employment of non-institutionalized 
i 
collective action, only act as a minor hindrance when people found it necessary 
to voice out their demands by this mean. In other words, the initiations of :  
i, 
ii 
collective action events were facilitated by such attitude of the government. ; 
The attitude of the Hong Kong Government towards non-institutionalized 
collective action was not characterized by a high propensity of repression. 
Instead, its position, although not lenient, could be defined as tolerant the 
right of assembly was not throttled but recognized though there has been the 
Public Order Ordinance; only a few of the instances resulted in police 
intervention and no severe degree of force was employed. 
In the sections below, the research will explain the reason for adopting the 
tolerant attitude from a historical perspective. Then the rationale of the Hong 
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Kong Government behind the Public Order (Amendment) 1980 Ordinance will 
be analyzed. After that, the gradual alteration and the content of the ordinance 
will be elaborated, following by discussions of the police handling of non-
institutionalized collective events. Their impacts will then be analyzed and it 
can be seen that the attitude did help to shape the action repertoire. 
Reason for Employing a Tolerant Attitude from a Historical Perspective 
The tolerant attitude of the government can be perceived as one of the 
official tactics “to cope with ever-increasing politicalized life of urban dwellers" 
(King, 1984:137), that can be traced back to the implementation of the City 
District Officer Scheme since the late 60's. 
As stated by King (1984), owing to the large-scale riot in 1967, a City 
District Officer was assigned to each urban district from 1968 onwards. The 
main function of whom was to abridge the gap between the government and the 
j 
grass-root. Meetings were held by the City District Officer to consult with 
various representatives of the district, for example, hawkers and taxi-drivers. 
With regard to the Public Order Ordinance, it was originally designated to 
restrict public assembly after the 1967 Riot. As will be soon revealed in the 
chapter, several housing conflicts in the late 70's such as the Yaumatai Boat 
People Incident^, precipitated its amendment in 1980. Nevertheless, by the time 
of its amendment in 1980, the right of assembly was confirmed and proclaimed 
by the government, which will be shown in the below section. 
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Rationale of the Government 
The Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance 1980 and the manifested police 
handling of the protest actions, actually reflected the government's position 
towards non-institutionalized collective action particularly public meetings and 
processions. Undoubtedly, a cautious attitude emphasizing on public security 
has been employed by the government, that was made explicit in a statement 
addressing the amendments of the Public Order Ordinance by the Attorney 
General: 
Also to bear in mind that although Hong Kong today is stable, and its 
population, with very few exceptions, responsible, it was not always so; and--
-who knows --- in the future issues unforeseen by any of us today may arise 
which could lead to the expression of strongly opposing views....who hold 
strong controversial views may, through misguided enthusiasm... .through 
malice, attempt to insist upon the expression of their views in places and at 
I 
times when to do so may risk or even be actually designed to cause unrest. ； 
I 
(Legco Proceeding, 1979-80: 1064-1065) | 
\ 
However, in the same speech, the right of assembly was ratified as well: 
in Hong Kong, as in every other community where the rule of law applies, 
citizens must be allowed to exercise the right to express publicly their views 
on matters of public interest of public controversy. They must be able to 
associate together freely to discuss those views. (Legco Proceeding, 1979-
80: 1064) 
Therefore, behind the restrictively tolerant attitude, was the attempt to find 
reconciliation between public security and order, and the right to assembly: 
a fair balance between those competing rights opinions may be freely 
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expressed and public pressure brought on governments and others, but only in 
an orderly manner and at the same time without inconvenience to or 
disrupting one's neighbour's life. (Legco Proceeding, 1979-80: 1064) 
Gradual Alteration of the Public Order Ordinance 
In 1967，the Public Order Bill was put forward, which was justified as a 
necessary response to the large scale riot happen in the preceding months. 
Hence, the notion of preventing and controlling disorder was emphasized. But 
at the same time, no reference to the right of the public to dissent or express their 
opinions by means of peaceful assembly was made (Mushkat, 1992). 
In essence, the 1967 Ordinance endorsed wide power to the relevant 
executive organs. The Commissioner of Police was granted the authority to 
prohibit the holding or continuance of any public gathering in any particular area 
or premises or on particular day if he considered it necessary or expedient in the 
interests of public order to so (sectionl5). The Governor in Council was 
il I! 
provided with the power to ban all public gatherings for up to three months if he ； 
considered it necessary to do so in order to prevent serious public disorder 
(section 16). A police officer of or above the rank of inspector was authorized 
to prevent the holding of, stop or disperse, or vary the place or route of any 
public meeting, public procession, or public gathering other than meetings 
exclusively for religious purposes (section 3). All police officers of any ranks 
were given the power to prevent the holding of, and to stop or disperse an 
unlicensed public meeting or public procession (section 11). 
The Public Order Ordinance 1967 also expanded the scope of unlawful 
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assembly and riot. If three or more persons assembled together conducted 
themselves in a manner intended or likely to cause anybody reasonably to fear a 
breach of the peace, regardless of whether they shared a common purpose, they 
would constitute an unlawful assembly (section 18). An unlawful assembly 
would amount to a riot as soon as any party present committed a breach of the 
peace (section 19). 
In 1970, the Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance was passed in the 
I' 
Legislative Council with the "recognition that some of the provisions of the !| 
ordinance confer unnecessarily wide powers in ordinary times and that, in a few 
instances, there may be a risk that innocent persons may be involved in offences” 
(LegCo. Proceeding. 1970-71:334). 
With regard to the amendments, the most significant of which were to 
narrow the ambit of the ordinance's application. The term, meeting, was 
丨  
I' 
redefined to include any meetings in which a degree of organization was | 1' 
involved A causal gathering of persons in a public space was excluded and 1 
I' 
was exempted to obtain a license. Exemptions are also made to creditors' 
meetings, sittings of court, funeral meetings, and meetings held for business or 
social purposes in licensed restaurants. Besides, the power of police officers to 
prevent the holding, stopping, and dispersing of public meetings (section 11) was 
also restricted, as well as the powers to prohibit the public display of banners and 
flags (section 3) to occasions where these could be believed to be necessary. 
The liabilities and offences under the ordinance were also to be 
circumscribed. The obligation imposed on the licensee to be present from the 
first assembly of its meeting to its fmal dispersal was amended to enable him the 
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defense of absence by reason of illness or other unavoidable cause. Similarly, a 
person responsible for the organization, promotion, direction, or management of 
a meeting which was prohibited by the Commissioner of Police under section 15 
would, under the new provision, be guilty of an offence only after the issue of the 
prohibition order. The plea of reasonable excuse was extended to persons 
charged with an offensive weapon in their possession at a public meeting or 
procession (section 14). The most important of all were the amendments of the 
— 
offences of unlawful assembly (section 18) and riot (section 19), requiring a 1 
disorderly, intimidating, insulting, or provocative element in the conduct of an 
assembly before it became unlawful. 
In 1979, as a result of several events like the "Yaumatai Boat People 
Incident" in which the government was criticized of severely constraining the 
freedom of assembly, a working party was established to make recommendations 
on the laws that were related to the licensing and controlling of public meetings 
�：: 
and processions. Eventually, the Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance 1980 , 
were enforced. As stated by Mushukat (1982)，the 1980 ordinance aimed at 
replacing the established licensing procedures pertainning to public assembly 
with a simplified system of police notification. Until 19^ July, 1995, no 
substantial changes on the laws regarding public meetings and processions have 
been implemented. 
Content of the Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance 1980 
Three majors means have been adopted to regulate the right of public 
assembly. According to Mushukat (1992)，they can be categorized as "prior 
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restraint，，，"subsequent punishment" and "dispersal powers，，. The first one, on 
the other hand, consisted of three measures, i.e., licensing, notification and 
banning orders. 
Licensing 
Public processions consisting of more than 20 persons and taking place on 
public highways, public thoroughfares, or public parks must be authorized by a y 
i,i 
license issued in writing by the Commissioner of Police (section 13). The !. 
;3 |3 
license— once given — was subject to such conditions relating to the forming, 丨  
:|! ;»' conduct, route, times of passing and dispersal of the procession as the j； '�; 
Commissioner of Police might impose, as well as a general condition that the !: 
licensee be present at the public procession from the first assembly thereof to the 
final dispersal thereof in order to ensure the due performance and compliance 
i' y || 
with the conditions of the license and the maintenance of public order throughout 
the period of assembly, conduct, and dispersal of the public procession (section 
;i' 15). 
A right of appeal to the Governor was granted to an aggrieved person whose 
application for a license is rejected or whose license was cancelled or amended 
(section 16). 
Notification 
Public meetings which involved or expected to involve more than 30 people 
in a public place or more than 200 people in private premises, excluding, 
however, meetings held in school or accredited educational establishments with 
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the consent of the management, were required to notify the Commissioner of 
Police seven working days in advance (section 7). The Commissioner of Police 
was granted the power to prohibit intended meetings notice of which has been 
given (section 9). The right of appeal to the Governor to rescind the prohibition 
order was provided (section 16). 
Banning Orders 
A general ban on all, or a class, of public gatherings in the territory for a 
period not exceeding three months might be imposed by the Governor in Council 
if he was satisfied that by reason of particular circumstances existing in Hong 
Kong or in any part thereof, it was necessary for the prevention of serious public 
disorder (section 17E). The Commissioner of Police was empowered to place a 
specific ban on public gatherings if it appeared to him to be necessary or 
expedient in the interests of public order so to do and regardless of whether the 
gathering was disorderly or violent (section 17D). 
Subsequent Punishment 
A person who without lawful authority at any public gathering made any 
statement or behaved in a manner which was intended or which he knew or ought 
to know was likely to incite or induce any person to engage in acts of violence 
was subject to prosecution (section 26). More disruptive forms of assembly 
were dealt with by invoking the offence of riot (section 19). 
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Dispersal Powers 
Dispersal powers have been conferred upon police officers (in the case of 
both lawful and unlawful gatherings) if they reasonably believed that such 
activities were likely to cause or lead to a breach of the peace (section 17). To 
facilitate the enforcement of dispersal orders, police officer might use such force 
as might be reasonably necessary to enter any premises in which persons were 
gathered to close specific places to the public (section 17). Failure to comply 
：] 
with dispersal orders was a criminal offence which was severely penalized j ] 
(section 17A). j 
f i 
Police Handling of the Collective Action Events 
II 
A study of how the police have handled the collective action events was ,! i I 
important because it reflected the actual implementation of the ordinance. Of 
the total 182 collective action events related to issues of public housing estates, 
> 
only three of them had the sending of the Police Force to stop the activities of the �� �/ 
participants, which occurred in 1991，1992 and 1993 respectively.' Force was 
employed by the police in the 1993 case while in the others, the participants 
dismissed peacefully. 
The three cases, superficially, seem to reveal that the government has 
employed a more repressive attitude in the 1990's. However, it is more 
accurate to say that no such kind of police interference occurred previously (from 
1980-1990) because the cases during this period did not involve the adoption of 
the "blockage tactics" like the three cases. Hence, instead of representing 
rollbacks to repression, the three cases reveal how instances entailing 
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"comparatively radical means" were tackled by the police. Because of their 
particularities, they will be briefly stated while the last one will receive more 
thorough analysis. 
Case 1---- 26^ September, 1991 
During the first open meeting of the Housing Authority, several 
representatives of a resident group hanged a banner from the second floor of the 
public gallery denouncing the double-rent policy. The banner was eventually ！ 
grabbed by the security. The protesters then left the chamber where the meeting 1 
was held. At the same time, another group of about 100 residents was watching 
the meeting broadcast in a lecture hall, who then tried to go out to meet with the 
| | 
leaving protesters. But the door in the hall was locked and they were separated 丨 
s 
I 
with the protesters. There were shouts and loud screams from the lecture hall. 5| 
,'' 
: , i 
Police were called in to stance guard. Finally, the residents left after members ：丨 
丨|' 'i' ： � 
of the Housing Authority agreed to meet them. � i:y 
i' 
Case 2— 25^ June, 1992 
There was a gathering of residents outside the headquarters of the Housing 
Authority to oppose its decision on rent increase. Police were called there after 
receiving report from the security that a group of people was attempting to 
"storai" the building. When the police arrived, some protesters complained that 
the guards refrained them from taking food and water to their representatives 
who had remained inside after meeting with the authority's officials. The 
protesters were later allowed to take food and water to their counterparts by the 
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police. In the morning after, the protesters left while those inside the 
headquarters used the "ox-walk" delay tactic to leave. 
Case 3— 25 '^ March, 1993 
About 150 tenants from 15 estates petitioned to the Government House to 
demand the abolition of the double-rent policy. They carried a pig's head and 
effigies of authority members after arriving at Upper Albert Road at about 1 p.m.. 
：! 
Police wanted the protesters to approach the East Gate behind the Government 
1 
House, but were refused by them and they sat in the road. Some tenants ,| 
»； 
eventually gave up. When 23 of them continued the sitting, the first official 
:i 
warning was issued at 5.15pm by the police, informing the protesters their '| 
assembly was illegal and they should leave in five minutes or face police action. 
Five minutes after the second waming at 5.55p.m.，30 police officers surrounded 
the protesters and escorted them to police trucks. There was no strong 丨 
'_.i ：>! resistance and the Upper Albert Road was re-opened soon. �'� 
V i r 
In an earlier time, about 300 tenants had blocked a south-bound lane of Fat 
Kwong Street in order to hold a mock funeral to mourn the "low-rent policy". 
About 20 of them were able to force their way into the ground floor lobby of the 
headquarters building. About 30 police tactical unit officers were called to 
mediate the situation and to stop the protesters from going up to the chamber on 
the 10^ floor. The protesters finally dismissed. 
Even repression by the police was resulted, the case that happened outside 
the Government House shows that their tactics towards the protesters were rather 
tolerant, soft and legal. It was because, with regard to the timing of repression, 
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i 
the police took action five hours after the protesters began to besiege the 
Government House and two warnings were given before the action. Besides, 
the degree of force used was mild as the protesters were only escorted to waiting 
rucks by the police. 
Impacts on the Collective Action Events 
The tolerant position of the Hong Kong Government on citizens right of 
1 
1 assembly as elaborated above, though not explicitly encouraged, did facilitate the j 
:i use of collective action especially those non-institutionalized ones, as a problem ； 
丨‘ 
solving strategy. In the following, it will be shown that the police had a high !； 
I 
••i 
propensity of granting permissions to public meetings and processions. Besides, 气 
.__ i 
the confidence of the participants were unintentionally enhanced. Most ! 
significantly, the ordinance paved for a variety of collective actions to be held 
without official permission. In addition, the position of the government also 
:f^  influenced the action repertoire. �� 
Police's Propensity of Granting Permissions 
It was true that public meetings and processions exceeding 30 (200 in 
private premises) and 20 participants respectively were required by the ordinance 
to obtain permissions from the police. Such requirements have been criticized 
as inhibiting the freedom of expression and discouraging the use of non-
institutionalized channels to exercise one's voice (Mushukat, 1992). But the 
crux was that the police have shown a high propensity to grant permissions to the 
two types of actions, which undeniably, rarely act as a deterrent when someone 
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found it necessary to do so. With regard to the absolute number (figure 9), no 
more than five applications was rejected annually from 1984-1990. Except for 
the year of 1984 in which 13% of the applications for processions was disallowed, 
not more than 4% were refused annually in both the categories of public 
meetings and processions (figure 10). An interviewee put his point frankly: 
We would still organize public meetings or processions when we 
found the problem unbearable despite of the regulations (the licensing 
t< 
and notification requirements). We would apply to the police ( 
whenever obliged, and in the majority of cases, we got the permissions. 
There is nothing to be fear of. !' 
, i 
I 
Figure 9. Applications for Public Meetings and Processions ； 
Applications 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Public Meetings ^~~~f08~~~^ ~^~~V76~~Wi~~365 
Disallowed 1 2 1 3 3 2 4 :: 
Processions 31 83 169 172 199 290 272 
Disallowed 4 1 4 2 5 3 4 ；; 
Note. South China Morning Post, 17 March 1991. 
Figure 10. Applications for Public Meetings and Processions in % 
Xpplications 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Public Meetings ^ ~ f 0 8 ~ ~ ^ ^ ~ ~ ~ P 7 6 ~ ~ 2 0 7 ~ ~ 3 ^ 
Disallowed 2.6% 1.9% 1.2% 3.3% 1.7% 1% 1.1% 
Processions 31 83 169 172 199 290 272 
Disallowed 13% 1.2% 2.4% 1.2% 2.5% 1% 1.5% 
Note. Caculated by the author from South China Morning Post, 17 March 
1991. 
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• 
The Confidence of the Participants 
The licensing and notification requirements of the Public Order 
(Amendment) Ordinance 1980 facilitated the employment of collective action in 
an unintentional way. The requirements, rather being big hindrances, gave a 
sense of legal legitimacy to the organizers or the participants. An interviewee 
said: 
We did worry little that our action would result in any persecutions because 
1 we found it really necessary to voice out our demands---the problems were 
ii 
simply intolerable, and partly because we got permission from the police; our :| 
action was legal. Therefore, there was no need for us to be scared. 
j 
1 Similarly, their confidence was enhanced by the relatively restraining style •] 
. j 
of the police towards protest action. From the previous analysis, it can be seen 
that police repression was characterized by quite soft and tolerant tactics. In the 
case analysis, except for the three cases discussed, one cannot found any 
i noticeable coursal interference by the police in the other instances. Another ;| 
丨,: 
interviewee commented: 
Apart from things such as the route of procession, the police seldom 
interfered us in our course of action. Even we saw that police repression was 
resulted in some cases; they were treated by civilized means like bringing to 
court. This helped us to reduce our anxiety by making us to believe that 
even we were arrested, we would be treated by some civilized means. 
Paving the Way for Other Types of Collective Action 
The Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance 1980 was conducive for a 
variety of collective actions to be held without government permission. Public 
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meetings and processions below 30 (200 in private premises) and 20 participants 
respectively were not required to be officially permitted, which enabled the 
movement organizations to be more flexible and made quicker responses to 
housing policies and problems. Within the cases of the research, these action 
types range from press conference to petition. They occupy 80 out of the total 
182 collective action events (see Figure 11). 
Figure 11. Number of Non-Institutionalized Collective Action 
Events Not Required to have Permissions 
i Year Number of : 
Cases 
~ m 2 ： 
81 1 
82 4 I 
8 3 4 : 
8 4 3 丨丨 
85 5 / i' 
8 6 7 
8 7 2 ：； 
88 2 ) 
8 9 1 
9 0 6 
9 1 9 
9 2 3 
9 3 1 0 
9 4 1 0 
9 5 1 1 
Total 80 
Note. Combined by the author from newspaper clippings provided by the 
^tholics Communication Center and the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies. 
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The Influence of Peaceful Tactics 
Undoubtedly, the low propensity of repression by the government was also 
influenced by the relatively peaceful tactics that were used by public housing 
tenants when voicing their demands. However, it should be cautious that such 
causal relationship is not irrefutable. The research of Porta (1996) on protest 
policing in Germany and Italy demonstrated that even severe degree of repression 
could be resulted from the peaceful exercise of the right of assembly. Hence, it 
is the government's attitude that is more decisive in understanding whether 
violent confrontation will happen, and the level of force involved. 
I ； 
i' �, 
,'_ 
Covert Forms of Repression !i 
li 
Undeniably, more covert forms of repression existed. Once there was the :| 
existence of a Special Committee on Pressure Group that concerned with �,� 
|! 
monitoring the activities of certain groups critical of government policy such as :f 
• '!, 
i‘： 
the Hong Kong Observers. The committee was disbanded only after severe ；,： 
)' / 
criticisms in 1983 (see Miners, 1995:194，for a more complete account). Even 
one of the interviewees admitted that in the earlier period, officers of the Special 
Duty Branch would visit some organizers' homes. Their wives were asked not 
to let their husbands to “do so many things". 
However, it was the presence of overt forms of suppression that was more 
crucial in determining the mobilizations of the collective action, than the 
existence of covert threats like the ones stated above. It was because the latter 
forms of threat were more selective and could only reach a small fraction of the 
people. More importantly, they could not ripped those lawful assemblies of 
64 
J 
their legal legitimacy---- people would still regard their action as within the law, 
and little need to be anxious of being persecuted even though someone told them 
to be more reticent. Hence, despite of the presence of such 'invisible' threats, 
the restrictively tolerant position of the Hong Kong Government served to 
facilitate the adoption of collective action particularly those that were non-
institutionalized. 
'1 
Impact On the Action Repertoire 
The analysis shows that associated with the government's low propensity of j 
•'! 
repression was the presence of quite moderate and peaceful forms of collective 
action. This phenomenon tends to support the hypotheses by Porta (1996), :| 
which say that a more tolerant, selective, and softer behaviour favours protest 
while more repressive, diffuse, and hard techniques of policing tend to, at the 
same time, discourage the mass and peaceful protest while fueling the more 
' t 
radical fringe. Similarly, in the Hong Kong context, the fact that the movement '1 
/ 
participants found it unnecessary to engage in more radical action, to a certain 
extent, was due to the restrictively tolerant position of the government. In this 
way, not only did the government's position on citizens right of assembly 
facilitated the employment of collective action if needed, it also exerted influence 
on the action repertoire. 
Conclusion 
The research possesses no evidence to say that there was any substantial 
relaxation in the Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance 1980 and the police 
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handling of the collective action events to account specifically for the large 
amount of cases from 1991-1995. Nevertheless, what the research has just 
revealed was that during the entire period of study (1980-1995), the tolerant 
attitude of the government, as revealed from the Public Order (Amendment) 
Ordinance 1980 and the police handling of protest events, though not explicitly 
encouraged the employment of non-institutionalized collective action, only act as 
a minor hindrance when people found it necessary to voice out their demands by 
this mean. 
In the next chapter, it will argue that the phenomena from 1991 to 1995，to a 
large extent, was the results of the retreat of resident groups from the formal 
institution and their reactions towards the still closed Housing Authority. 
V 
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Notes 
1. Only three collective action events concerning issues of public housing 
estates were recorded after the enforcement of the ordinance in 1995. Despite of 
its late passage, it is still worth mentioning the background and the content of the 
ordinance. 
The Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance 1995 was a response to the Hong 
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance that came into force on 8^ June, 1991，in which 
the "right of Assembly" was ratified in Article 17. It states that: 
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions 
may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in 
conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security or public safety, public order (order public), 
the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
Since section 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance requires pre-existing 
legislation to be structured consistently with the provisions of the Bill of Rights, 
the Public Order (Amendment) Bill 1994 was put to the Legislative Council and 
was passed by the council in 1995 after scrutiny. The main amendments are of 
twofold. The limit on the number of participants taking part in processions and 
public meetings without notification is raised from 20 to 30, and from 30 to 50 
respectively. The establishment of an independent appeal board, chaired a 
retired judicial official, to hear appeals against decisions by the Commissioner of 
Police relating to processions and public meetings. 
2 It is/was not unusual for the police to appear in certain kinds of collective 
action such as procession, to control the traffic, etc. The research will focus 
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only on instances in which the police were called to stop the ongoing activities of 
the participants to maintain order. 
3 In 1977, the Tanka people (the natives of Hong Kong who were traditionally 
engaged in fishing) living in the Yau Me Tai typhoon shelter demanded 
resettlement on land. They were assisted by some social workers and tertiary 
students. Numerous petitions were organized. Some petitioners were arrested 
by the police. The government was condemned of its way of handling the 
incident as constraining the freedom of peaceful assembly. 
/ 
68 
Chapter 6 
Formal and Informal Access for Participants of the Public Housing 
Movement 
Figures from chapter four show that there was a rising trend of collective 
action events between 1991-1995. Besides, the period was characterized by a 
high annual number of cases. If social movements or the various protest actions 
are really tactical responses to a closed and coerced environment as stated by 
McAdam (1982), the figures do present a seemingly puzzling phenomenon. It 
is because in an inclusive political system, i.e., a system that allows more 
extensive and equal mass political participation, the incentive to engage in 
collective actions (especially non-institutionalized ones) will be much more 
reduced as there are now formal ways of expressing concems to officials, which 
certainly involve fewer cost. Electing a representative to voice out one's 
interests, for instance, demands less effort and time than participating in a 
petition to proclaim the interests. Besides, the former methods are much less 
likely to be arrested by the police. However, it is revealed in the Hong Kong 
case that on the one hand, channels of formal access have been much more 
increased and enlarged than those previously~— not only were the number of 
directly elected seats being raised in the District Boards and in the Urban and the 
Regional Councils, but also universal suffrage was introduced to the Legislative 
Council with its scope extended later. On the other hand, instances of collective 
action initiated by resident groups, of which the majority were non-
institutionalized, was also on the rise. It seems that a more inclusive political 
69 
system did not bring about a decrease in collective actions especially those non-
institutionalized, as expected. 
The opacity of the above phenomenon is ceased with regard to the facts that 
formal access to the Housing Authority was still lacking and it had a low level of 
accountability to the public; and albeit participants of the public housing 
movement could send their representatives to run for elections, they (the 
representatives) could exert very finite influence over the Housing Authority 
even they became members of the formal institution. Superficially, there 
seemed to be a rejuvenation of the public housing movement from 1991-1995. 
In this chapter, it will argue that the comparatively large amount of 
instances of collective action between 1991-1995, to a very large extent, can be 
interpreted as the outcome of the followings---- the retreat of resident groups 
from formal institution owing to the disappointment towards the notion of a 
representative government; and their responses towards the still closed or 
undemocratic Housing Authority. 
Before proceeding to elaborate, the democratization process that started 
from the local administrative level and the history of resident groups' 
participation in this process will be delineated first. 
The Democratization Process 
The notion of a representative government began to develop in the early 
80's with the introduction of the District Board Election in 1982. According to 
Leung (1996), the election actually aimed at including an elected element to 
accommodate the pressure group activists but retaining a majority of pro-
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government appointed members in the composition. Therefore, the 
implementation of the District Boards scheme was originally another mechanism 
for the absorption of politics rather than as a preclude to more fundamental 
political reform. But as a result of the Sino-British negotiations during the early 
80's and the Joint Declaration of 1984, the notion of a representative government 
was now carried out against the background that: 
the colonial government had to arrange for the relinquishing of political 
power to the indigenous population in preparation for Hong Kong 's post 
1997 status as a Special Administrative Region with a high degree of 
autonomy under the sovereign of China (Leung, 1996:165). 
In spite of the process's slow development, undoubtedly, the access for 
mass political participation has been much more expanded. In the following, 
the development of the District Boards, the Urban/the Regional Councils and the 
Legislative Council will be elaborated respectively. It was because they made 
up the bodies allowing the public including participants of the public housing 
movement to become members of the formal political structure by the mean of 
election. 
The Development of the District Boards 
The District Boards were first established in 1981. Before their formation, 
the District Advisory Boards and the City District Committees had been set up 
respectively in the New Territories and the urban area, which consisted entirely 
of appointed members chosen by the District Officer of each district. Following 
the 1981 White Paper, District Administration in Hong Kong, the first District 
Board Election was held in 1982, through which one-third of the board members 
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were chosen by universal suffrage/ It was also scheduled that elections were to 
be held in every three years. In 1985，the proportion of elected members 
changed from one-third to two-third. Besides, the number of seats was also 
doubled. In 1988 and 1991，a few more seats were added. More substantial 
changes occurred in 1994. According to the electoral reform initiated by the 
Governor, Chris Patten, all appointed seats in the urban area and the New 
Territories were abolished except for a few reserving for members of the Heung 
Yee Kuk. In addition, all board members were to form an electoral college 
selecting 10 representatives to the Legislative Council. 
The Development of the Urban>' the Regional Councils 
The Urban Council was first formed in 1936 and some of its members have 
been elected by limited franchise until the election that was held in 1981. In 
1983, it was opened to popular election like the Districts Boards. The urban 
area was divided into 15 constituencies, each returning one councillors. At the 
same time, the number of elected seats was raised from 12 to 15, comprising one-
half of the totals. In 1986，a similar council, the Regional Council, was 
established in the New Territories with 12 seats for direct election. In 1989，10 
new seats were added for the District Board members to select their 
representatives. In the 1995 election, the amount of directly elected seats 
increased from 15 to 32 for the Urban Council and 12 to 27 for the Regional 
Councils. 
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The Development of the Legislative Council 
Indirect election was introduced into the Legislative Council only in 1985. 
Under this election, 12 councillors were elected by and from members of the 
District Boards, the Urban and the Regional Councils. Another 12 were voted 
from nine functional constituencies composing of professionals, namely, 
commercial, industrial, financial, labour, social services, education, legal, 
medical, and engineers and associated professions. In the 1988 election, two 
functional constituencies, i.e., accounting and sanitary, were included. 
Breakthroughs occurred in the 1991 election, in which 18 members were directly 
elected by universal suffrage from nine geographical constituencies. Further 
changes took place in the 1995 election as a result of the Governor's reform. 
Most important of all, the appointment system was abandoned. There were now 
20 directly elected seats. Another 10 councillors were chosen from an election 
committee consisting of members from the 18 District Boards. Nine new 
functional constituencies chiefly designated for the working people were ratified. 
They included: primary production, power and construction; textiles and 
garments; manufacturing; import and export; wholesale and retail; hotels and 
catering; transport and communication; financing, insurance, real estate and 
business services; and community, social and personal services. 
History of Resident Groups' Participation in the Formal Institution 
It can be seen that public housing movement organizations or resident 
groups have already cast their participation in the inchoate stage of the 
democratization process as shown in the below figure.^ The heyday of 
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participation was in the 1985 District Board Election in which 10 candidates 
were sent to campaign. However, the number of candidates sponsored was 
greatly reduced to 3 in the 1988 District Board Election. With regard to the 
locations of the constituencies, most lied within the Sham Shui Po and the Wong 
Tai Sin Districts, reflecting the power bases of these organizations. What is 
most noticeable is that they have no longer sent their representatives since the 
1991 District Board Election. The beginning of their retreat from the formal 
political structure coincided with the beginning of a period that was marked by 
rising instances of collective action particularly those non-institutionalized ones. 
Figure 12. Participation of the Movement Organizations in 
Elections 
Name of the Election No. of Candidates 
82 District Boards Election 1 
85 District Boards Election 10 
86 Urban/ Regional Councils Election 3 
88 District Board Election 3 
89 Urbany^  Regional Councils Election 0 
91 District Boards Election 0 
91 Urban/ Regional Councils Election 0 
91 Legislative Council Election 0 
94 District Boards Election 0 
95 Urban/ Regional Councils Election 0 
Note. Combined by the author from the Resource Books of Hong Kong 
Elections, 1982-1994, & 1995 edited by Louie Kin Shuen and Shum Kwok 
Cheung (1994 and 1995). 
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The analysis of Tang (1991) offered a brief description of some of the 
movement candidates that participated in the 1985 District Board Elections. 
They were young, living with their parents in public housing estates, and 
參 
upwardly mobile social activists, who focused on massive public housing 
redevelopment issues and were active in organizing affected tenants. They 
tended to position themselves as the upwardly mobile, second-generation 
housing activists who committed to help themselves and their neighbours. Such 
image was different from the Kaifong and Mutual Aid Committee leaders that 
were regarded as old and conservative. More significantly, they were adroit in 
handling the relationship with the mass media and politically significantly 
bodies. 
It should be realized that some of the candidates that were once sent by the 
movement organizations still have taken an active part in the elections held in the 
1990，s. The difference was that the majority of them have now cast their 
participation in the name of a political party. However, rather than representing 
a through split with their bygone companions, their relationship was one of 
intricate. A participant of a resident group commented: 
We now seldom allow them to join us for we do not want to be too political. 
What about cooperation in housing issues? It depends. But most of the 
tenants now would go to their offices to make complaints but not to us 
anymore. 
A social worker commented about resident groups' participation in the 
formal institution: 
I cannot see there were any specific strategies underlying their participation. 
Actually, there was a group of people from resident groups, mostly social 
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workers and intellectuals who wanted to campaign in elections probably 
under the influence of the notion of a representative government. They had 
certain linkage among themselves. The resident groups ceased to take part 
in the elections when most of them have gone away to continue their 
education. For those who stayed, the resident groups did not want to sponsor 
them anymore for their dissatisfactory performance. 
The statement above may explain some of the reason behind resident 
groups' participation in the formal institution. However, its explanation for the 
reason of their retreat is not adequate. It should be noted that even though some 
of the participants have gone while some had far from satisfactory performance, 
the organizations could have selected other members for participating in elections, 
particularly the District Board Election in which community experience may be 
more decisive than educational background, if they really had possessed the 
intention. It will be argued that it is their disappointment towards the formal 
/ 
institution as the substantial factor leading to their retreat. 
Disappointment towards the Formal Institution 
The disappointment of resident groups towards the formal institution 
stemmed from two factors. One was the inability of the elected bodies to exert 
effectively the power of surveillance over public housing policies. The other 
was their dissonance towards the logic of electoral politics. 
Limitations of the District Boards 
It is true that the District Boards have been acting as a medium of popular 
participation in the management of district affairs. They were consulted by the 
government about what should be done. But they had no right to give 
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instructions to government officials and refute government decisions. Their 
influence on public corporations like the Housing Authority was even less. The 
truth was that whether their opinions were accepted depend on the considerations 
of the Housing Authority or the Governor-in-Council. Even most District 
Boards, for example, have proclaimed against the double-rent policy, the 
Housing Authority still launched it in 1987. In another instance, a housing 
official has rejected the demand of the Kwai-Ching District Board to establish a 
joint-department committee to oversee the redevelopment programme in the area 
for the reason that there already had had enough channels of communication 
between the Housing Authority and government departments. 
Limitations of the Urban and the Regional Councils 
The Urban and the Regional Councils have been the only governing bodies 
possessing both elected members and the executive power to direct the work of 
government departments, namely, the Urban and the Regional Services 
Departments. Nevertheless, due to their limited scope of functions, they were 
not entitled to deal with and discuss issues of public housing. Given this 
constraint, it is not hard to understand that participants of the movement were 
less eager to campaign in the elections of these two councils even in their heyday 
of political participation (see figure 12). The main duties of the two councils 
involved the following: 
Environment and Public Health 
i) the construction and management of markets and abattoirs, the licensing and 
control of hawkers and offensive trades; 
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ii) street cleansing, refuse disposal; public conveniences and bath-houses; 
sewers, drains, and wells; 
iii) the licensing and inspection of food premises, the sampling and testing of 
food and drugs, food poisoning; 
iv) district public health; house inspections, the investigation and abatement of 
nuisances, pest control, malarial control, infectious diseases; 
V) the licensing and control of laundries, commercial bath-houses, funeral 
parlours, and undertakers; the management of cemeteries and crematoria; 
Recreation and Culture 
i) the management and maintenance of bathing beaches, swimming pools, 
tennis courts, parks, playgrounds, sports complexes, and stadiums; 
ii) the licensing of billiard saloons, bowling alleys, skating rinks, table tennis 
saloons, and places of public entertainment; 
iii) the licensing of places where liquor is sold; 
iv) the management of public libraries, museums, art galleries, cultural centres 
and the City Hall. (Miners, 1995:158) 
Limitations of the Legislative Council 
The Legislative Council, compared to the District Boards, and the Urban 
and the Regional Councils, possessed greater power of influence over public 
housing policies because of its status as the highest body of law-making. The 
Legislative Council has been able to exert its influence on the Housing Authority 
by passing the annual budget of the latter (this ftinction was ceased in 1992 when 
it was able to be financially self-responsible). Besides, members of the council 
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could also question operations and policies of the authority, which were to be 
answered by government officials. Moreover, they could initiate motions to 
express their views or to demand the government to take actions on public 
housing policies. Despite of these power of surveillance, the Housing Authority 
had a low level of accountability to the Legislative Council prior or after the 
former's reorganization. The authority was not obliged to keep the council 
informed when formulating policies nor was it obliged to discuss new or 
controversial policies with the council when they were implemented. The 
minimal power of surveillance was manifested in an instance in which the 
Housing Panel of the council was denied a review report on the double-rent 
policy. According to the Director of Housing, the authority's decision was 
based on the ground that it would not be correct for the report to be made 
available for discussion by the Legco panel before the authority members had 
received and studied it. 
Another constraint of the Legislative Council was that even information was 
available, the amount and the nature of the information might also subject to the 
discretion of government officials or the Housing Authority. In a case about 
sub-standard housing blocks, the Housing Panel was not accorded with enough 
information and had to demand for more details of the matter. 
Albeit the government has appointed some of the Legco councillors as 
members of the Housing Authority, they only served in an individual basis, and 
thus, were unable to monitor the work of the authority in the name of the Legco. 
In addition, they have been prohibited from disclosing confidential information 
to the public. 
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A motion might be carried by the Legco. But k was not necessarily the case 
that the Housing Authority or the government would change its policies 
according to the motion. In December, 1992, a motion demanding the 
abolishment of the double-rent policy was put forward. Albeit it was supported 
by a marginal vote, the Housing Authority insisted that it was not binding. The 
controversy was put to an end when the Executive Council gave its support to the 
Housing Authority. In June, 1993，a motion that urged the Housing Authority 
to conduct and publish a detailed review of the cleanliness, sanitation and 
management in public rental and Home Ownership Scheme estates, was carried. 
However, the move was later condemned by the majority of the authority 
member as “ a political show" and "demoralizing staff spirt，，. 
Also, in June, 1993，another motion calling on the government to allocate 
more residential sites for private and public housing in order to meet the need of 
the middle and the lower income group, was carried. But the motion was 
simply replied by a government official as unnecessary, and that the government 
understood the public housing need but it had to weight up the importance of 
commercial land versus residential sites. 
Dissonance with the Logic of Electoral Politics 
Another factor contributed to resident groups' retreat from the formal 
institution was their refusal to comply with the logic of electoral politics. 
Similar answers were provided by the interviewees when they were asked 
about the question that why their organizations no longer sent members for 
elections. An interviewee offered a typical answer: 
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The District Boards and the councils were ineffective. Even they (the 
members) were elected, they could give us just a little more information. 
However, the cost was bigger than the benefit. Their titles and the 
parliaments were so attractive that they did not pay any attention to us and to 
raise the consciousness of the Kaifongs any more.l 
It is not to deny the existence of unruly behaviours among some of the 
elected members, which might be crucial in leading to the splits with their 
movement counterparts. But the statement above also helps to reveal the 
principles or ideals of the movement organizations. What has been emphasized 
was the belief of mass participation. According to the belief, the role of the 
organizer should have concentrated on raising the reflexivity of the mass towards 
their own situations or problems, but not standing at the front to claim to 
represent their interests. More significantly, those affected, instead of merely 
offering their presence, should have been actively and collectively involved and 
taken part in the course of struggle---- they should have decided their own 
strategies and demands. It was expected that aside from solving problems or 
alleviating situations, by undergoing such process, self-development of the 
participants was achieved. 
Contrary to the belief of mass participation, the logic of electoral politics 
stressed on representation by the elected. The most important element of it was 
to select representatives, by the mean of elections, whom could act on behalf of 
their constituents to be responsible for the administration and the checking of the 
state. Besides, mass mobilization was usually and only needed in times of 
elections. In addition, constituents were expected to reflect their concems or 
problems to the elected representatives, which were in tum, brought to the 
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parliaments or solved through institutionalized means. 
The discrepancies discussed have inevitably aroused conflicts between the 
elected and their movement companions, leading to the retreat of the movement 
organizations from formal institution. Conflicts were more likely to occur as 
the elected members would have lesser time to pay attention to their respective 
organizations and to their concerns because of the fact that they had to be 
accountable to other constituents and matters. Furthermore, since the members' 
legal legitimacy depended on their being elected by the constituents, which in 
turn, depended on whether the latter consented with their performances, it was 
simply impossible for them to stay behind or among their movement counterparts 
to help them to organize like before, for the fear that their effort would not be 
recognized by the public. Instead, they had to stance at the front and made 
themselves to be easily noticed, which might made other participants look like 
their supporters. An organizer commented: 
When they were elected, they changed. The most important of which was 
that they no longer willed to stance behind or with the mass but stance in front 
of them to act like "a star，，. Fairly speaking, it was really difficult for them 
to stay behind or with the mass to help the latter to organize because most 
constituents would expect their elected representatives to represent their 
interests and solve their problems for them. If they always encouraged the 
Kaifongs to stance out and take action, the Kaifongs would inevitably 
question, "Given the fact that this fellow always asks us to come out but 
cannot represent us, why we should elect him/ her?" 
Moreover, the elected members were now less likely to participate or help to 
initiate mass mobilization as the logic of electoral politics demanded that 
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problems or suggestions should have been reflected by the councillors or the 
board members through the parliaments. Even mass mobilizations were 
initiated by them, the action was more probably aimed at arousing the attention 
of the mass media so as to increase their bargaining power with the government 
officials. A District Board member said: 
I am still concerned about the same problems as before. But since I am a 
board member, its very natural for me to discuss them in board meetings. 
Actually, I haven't changed my stance at all. What have changed may be 
my ways of handling matters. 
In addition, mutual distrust was deepened or caused by the fact that the 
elected representatives might become hesitate to adopt the standpoints or policy 
suggestions of their organizations. An elected member explained the reason of 
hesitation: 
We can get more information and better communication with government 
officials now. We understand more clearly the standpoints of the 
government, and what can and cannot be practically achieved. 
Such condition of being better informed owing to their legal status have 
created an unintended dilemma. An interviewee put it frankly: 
I am in a very difficult situation. I know that they (my companions) have 
demands from me. Being a member of the formal institution, I understand 
clearly the limits of what can be done and so I understand their demands is 
most of the time, impossible to achieve. I am put into a dilemma—if I 
really follow their claims, I can always get their support. However, when I 
am back into the board meetings, no one will support me because of the 
impracticability of my suggestions, and finally nothing can be done. Since I 
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am elected by the mass, I have to be responsible to them and thus, I have to 
achieve some results at least. 
The doubtful attitude of resident groups towards the effectiveness of the 
formal institution also revealed in their reluctance to come to the OMELCO 
Office to present their protests or suggestions when changes about public housing 
policies were involved. As revealed by the figure below, there was only one 
case in which petition to the OMELCO was involved from 1991-1995. From 
1992 onwards, such type of collective action was not found in the case analysis. 
An organizer commented: 
Why we do not go to the OMELCO anymore? The reason is very simple: 
we have realized that the Legislative Council cannot influence public housing 
policies. It is the law-making body but it has never succeeded in stopping 
any rent increase. Thus, it is simply a waste of time to go there. We will 
now march directly to the Housing Authority instead to press the members to 
accept our claims. Even if they do not accept our demands, we can still 
make them to listen to our voice or complaints. We think this strategy is 
more effective. 
Figure 13. Number of Cases Involving Petition to the OMELCO 
Year Number of Cases ^ 
81 1 
82 2 
83 1 
84 
85 
86 6 
87 3 
88 2 
84 
_ J 
9 0 1 
9 1 1 
9 2 
9 3 
9 4 
^ 
Note. Combined by the author from newspaper clippings provided by the 
Catholics Communication Center and the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies. 
The Closed Housing Authority 
In spite of its reorganization in 1988, the development of the Housing 
Authority has lagged behind the democratization process. Its low level of 
accountability has led to the continual employment of collective action method to 
voice out demands about issues of public housing, even when formal channels of 
mass participation have been enlarged. The history and the duties of the 
authority will be briefly reviewed in the immediate section before analyzing its 
extent of openness. 
A Brief Review of the Housing Authority 
A Housing Authority was first established in 1954 to provide better public 
housing for people who were not squatters and who were in higher income 
brackets (over $ 400) than those in the resettlement estates. In 1973, in order to 
implement the Ten-Year Housing Progranune, all existing housing agencies 
including the Resettlement Board were unified into the new Housing Authority. 
It was headed by the government's Secretary of Housing and ruled by a board of 
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17 members who were appointed by the Governor. The Housing Department 
was to become its executive arm. Departmental officers were delegated by the 
Housing Authority with authority to discharge its general powers and duties 
under the Housing Ordinance. From V' April, 1988, the Housing Authority was 
reorganized to accommodate the Long Term Housing Strategy. The role of the 
authority has mainly expanded to takeover the responsibilities concerning the 
Home Ownership Scheme from the government. Change also occurred in the 
composition of the authority's membership. A non-official member has 
assumed the chairperson. The number of non-official members, including the 
chairperson, has raised to 20. New financial arrangements with the government 
have been implemented as well. Under the new arrangements, the government 
would inject capital to the authority as permanent government capital, which 
must be repaid within a certain period at a premium of 5%. Profits generated 
from non-residential purposes such as rents from shops and car parks have to be 
shared equally between the government and the authority. The undemeath 
functions have been assigned to the authority by the Housing Ordinance prior and 
after its reorganization: 
i) to liaise with other bodies concerned with other bodies concerned with 
housing in both the public and private sectors and to advice the Governor on 
matters affecting housing; 
ii) to plan, build and redevelop public housing estates, Home Ownership 
Scheme courts and temporary housing areas for classes of people determined 
by the Authority and approved by the Governor; 
iii) to manage public housing estates, temporary housing areas, cottage areas and 
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transit centers; 
iv) to manage flatted factories and commercial facilitates in public housing 
estates and Home Ownership Scheme courts; 
V) to dispose of flats produced under the Home Ownership Scheme and to 
manage Home Ownership courts; 
vi) to administer the Home Purchase Loan Scheme; 
vii) to act as Government's agent----
to clear land; 
to prevent and control squatting; 
to plan and to coordinate improvements to squatter areas; and 
to plan and to administer the Private Sector Participation Scheme; 
viii) to approve the annual estimates of expenditure and revenue for submission 
to the Governor; and 
ix) to approve the Annual Report for submission to the Governor. 
(Hong Kong Housing Authority Annual Report 1989/90: 137) 
Channels of Opinion and Grievances Redress 
The Appeals and the Complaints Committees have existed within the 
Housing Authority for tenants to redress their grievances. Besides, 
consultational documents may be published in order to invite public opinions on 
specific housing policies.^ 
The Appeals Committee was a statutory body established under the Housing 
Ordinance, the function of which is “to listen to appeals in the case of tenancies 
which had been terminated by the Housing Authority under section 20 of the 
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Housing Ordinance" (Hong Kong Housing Authority Annual Report 1984/85: 
23). 
• • 
The Complaints Committee was established in 1988. Its function was to 
determine what action within existing policies should be taken on the complaint. 
Its terms of reference included: housing allocation; squatter registration; housing 
subsidy and other public housing related complaints. 
Tenants or participants of the movement could give their opinions on a 
specific policy after that policy was proclaimed in the form of consultational 
document. They could send back their suggestions in the form of written 
proposals to the Housing Authority. 
Limitations of the Channels 
«) 
The three channels were inadequate in pacifying discontents of tenants or 
participants of the movement. It was because the functions^ of the two 
committees are quite confined in scope. They could only handle individual 
complaints involving maladministration by the authority staff. They were not 
access for tenants or participants of the movement to express their 
dissatisfactions towards housing policies or towards problems of territorial 
nature. 
Albeit consultational documents might be published, such kind of 
consultation tended to be selective by the fact that not every policy was available 
to public discussion. The Mid Term Review of the Long Term Housing 
Strategy, for instance, was proclaimed without prior consultation. Even 
consultation was implemented, it remained an unknown of how the various 
88 
suggestions were to be treated, and it showed that sometimes the authority did 
not employ a serious attitude in seeking public advice. The Long Term 
Housing Strategy, for instance, was to be implemented from 1985-2001. But its 
consultational document was distributed only in 1987. The Home- Purchase 
Scheme was ratified before the deadline of the consultational period (see Hong 
Kong Economic Journal, 2"' May, 1987). 
In other words, what has been lacking in the Housing Authority was a 
scheme in which members of the authority would meet the public regularly to 
hear their concerns. 
Beside with the above inadequacies, discontent towards the Housing 
Authority has also been intensified by the appointment system that obviously has 
little transparency, which has been perceived as lagging behind the 
democratization context and has been only representing the interests of the 
capitalists but not those of housing tenants or the grass-root. 
Composition of the Authority's Members 
Open access for tenants or others to enter into the formal structure of the 
authority has been simply lacking despite of its reorganization in 1988. All 
non-official members have been appointed by the Govemor, like other advisory 
committees，for example, the Transport Advisory Committee. In addition, the 
criteria of selection have not been made explicit. It remained an unknown of 
how and why the members were chosen. As seen from figure 14，the majority 
of them came from professional and business sectors. What was obvious was a 
low level of representation from public housing tenants and resident groups albeit 
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they were directly and substantially affected by decisions of the Housing 
Authority. Even after the first direct election of the Legislative Council in 1991, 
there were only two members who were directly elected from geographical 
constituencies. In spite of the statutory power of the authority, all its members 
have been sitting in an individual capacity. 
Figure 14. Background of the Non-Official Members of the Housing 
Authority 
Year Business Profession- Tenants Resident Directly 
Sectors Als Association Elected 
Representa- Elected 
tives Legco 
Members 
80-81 6 5 1 
81-82 6 5 1 
82-83 7 6 1 
83-84 8 5 1 
84-85 9 4 1 
85-86 7 6 1 
86-87 7 6 1 
87-88 8 10 1 
88-89 8 10 1 
89-90 6 11 1 1 
90-91 6 11 1 1 
91-92 6 11 1 1 2 
92-93 6 11 1 1 2 
94-95 3 13 1 1 2 
95-96 3 n 1 1 2 
Note. Combined by the author from the Annual Reports of the Hong Kong 
H^sing Authority 1980-1996. 
The appointment system has been praised by the government as capable of 
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selecting members with a board range of experience and representation, who, 
together, could apply a critical and conscientious experience in determining 
public housing policies. 
On the contrary, such appointment system has been criticized by some 
resident groups and movement participants as: lagging behind the pace of 
democratization; since members were selected on an individual basis by the 
Governor, they lacked the intention of being accountable to their respective 
groups and housing tenants, and would act only according to the favour of the 
government; it was dubious whether members from the business and the 
professional sectors who possessed close connections with land developers, could 
keep their vested interests from influencing their decisions. What the 
movement participants clamoring for was a system in which members were 
either directly elected or chosen from the elected bodies. 
It could not be denied that the appointment system did apply to other 
statutory corporations such as the Hospital Authority; through which members 
from different backgrounds were selected into a committee (in some cases, with 
high-ranking officials) that acts as the highest-level decision making body of the 
corporation. A specific government department executes the corporation's daily 
operations, in turn. The fact that the appointment system of the Housing 
Authority tends to draw more criticisms because it provides shelters for more 
than 60% of the population and thus, and exerts substantial influence on the 
livelihood of most of the people in the territory. The centrality of housing 
issues in people's value system is also reflected. 
The inadequacies discussed previously, to a very large extent, have 
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“justified，，the adoption of non-institutionalized collective action as means of 
clamour especially in issues related to housing policies and large-scale problem. 
The analysis is best supported by figure 15. 
Figure 15. Collective Actions Concerning Policy and Territorial 
Issues Initiated by Resident Groups 
Year Number of Cases Annual Total 
^ 50r%^ 7(100%)~~ 
81 1(100%) 1(100%) 
82 4(80%) 5(100%) 
83 5(83%) 6(100%) 
84 2(50%) 4(100%) 
85 17(100%) 17(100%) 
86 21(100%) 21(100%) 
87 5(83%) 6(100%) 
88 3(100%) 3(100%) 
89 2(100%) 2(100%) 
90 6(100%) 6(100%) 
91 13(93%) 14(100%) 
92 7(100%) i { i m i ) 
93 9(90%) 10(100%) 
94 9(60%) 15(100%) 
^ 13(62%) 21(100%) 
Note. Combined by the author from newspaper clippings provided by the 
^ S o l i c s Communication Center and the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies. 
Informal Procedures of the Housing Authority 
Despite of a dearth of formal channels, the informal procedures used by the 
Housing Authority towards participants of the public housing movements can be 
characterized as one of fairly consultative and responsible, manifesting as 
officials' and members，willingness to engage in dialogue with the latter. Such 
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characteristics have become more apparent since 1991. The research's case 
analysis reveals that there were just four cases involving closed-door discussion 
with representatives from the Housing Authority during 1980-1990, while 
between 1991-1995, the amount of similar cases rose to 14. In addition， 
petitioners may demand a particular member to receive their letters. In 1995, 
the authority tried to appoint a movement participant into its complaint 
committee but was denied by the latter. 
However, the actual effect or strength of such informal facilitation of access 
should not be overestimated. The Housing Authority has employed an adamant 
position particularly when rental policy was involved. If only policy or 
territorial issues were considered, it was found that the authority has partly 
consented with the demands of resident groups in just three instances, namely, 
rooftop insulation in 1980; right of inheritance in 1984 and security facilities in 
1994. 
The informal procedures, in spite of its absence of real effects, do possess 
certain function as revealed in the beneath words of a movement organizer: 
Although I deprecate such gesture myself, it must be admitted that they 
sometimes help to reduce the discontent of the Kaifongs. Those with little 
experience or lower demands may think, "It's quite good at least some of the 
officials or members are willing to meet us." They felt very appreciated, as 
it seemed that the Housing Authority showed concern to their problems, even 
the official they sent was just a housing officer who could promise them little. 
Besides, another important effect of the gesture is that it helped to make the 
'institutionalization of non-institutionalized actions'--— protesting actions 
have become confined to a few types such as petition to the authority and, 
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holding press conference and then seeking dialogue with the authority. Most 
of them do not bother to think of other strategies. On the contrary, we now 
prefer more direct confrontations to press the authority to accept our claims. 
Mobilization Capacity of the Movement Organizations 
In spite of the existence of a fecund image between 1991-1995, the 
organizational strength, or put more precisely, the mobilization capacity, of 
resident groups should not be overestimated. The rising amount of collective 
action events and the relatively large annual number of cases during the period 
do not denote that these organizations were much more strengthen than they were 
previously. It was because, as shown from the figure of chapter four, a great 
number of the instances were still cadre-oriented, requiring less manpower to 
initiate and participate than those of mass-oriented. 
The viewpoint is further supported by the underneath figure. Organization 
X (pseudonym) has once taken an active part in the democratization process by 
sending members for elections. After its withdrawal from the elections held in 
1991，the type of collective action (those about public housing matters) it 
employed were mostly cadre-oriented, meaning that there were not more than 20 
participants in the actions. 
Figure 16. Collective Actions Employed by Organization X— 
Cadre-Oriented (CO.) or Mass-Oriented (MO.) 
Year Number of CO. Case Number of MO. Case 
~ n 6 0 ^ 2(25%) 
92 2(67%) 1(33%) 
9 3 1(33%) 2(67%) 
94 
~ ^ 3 ( 1 0 0 % ) 
9 5 3 ( 1 0 0 % ) 
Note. Combined by the author from newspaper clippings provided by the 
Catholics Communication Center and the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies. 
Hence, it can be said that organizations of the public housing movement 
have always possessed very moderate mobilization capacity or organizational 
strength, tending to be unaltered by their decisions to take part or retreat from the 
formal institution. However, it should be noticed that even similar action 
repertoire was used, the meanings or effects attributed to it may have changed 
under the democratized context. An organizer put it: 
There might be a rise in the quantity of the collective action. But what about 
the matter of quality? I do not think there was any improvement with regard 
to it. In the 70's, holding a press conference or petition to the authority was 
a great deal for people from the Specific Duty Unit would surely keep an eye 
on you. I cannot find any meaning or effect attributed to them in the 90's 
when society has become more opened. Such types of action are too trite to 
make any impacts. 
Strong State and Inclusive Dominant Strategy 
If the typology of Kriesi (1995) is used to conceptualize the Hong Kong 
case, it is not difficult to realize that the case here is more resemble to the case in 
Netherlands than the other three cases in France, Germany and Switzerland. A 
strong state did exist in the sense that the elected bodies could exert very slight 
influence on public housing policies, rather than meaning the absence of formal 
channels for mass political participation. The Housing Authority has enjoyed a 
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heavy concentration of power and has paid responsibility only to the Govemor-
in-Council. On the other hand, there has been informal facilitation of access as 
revealed by the quite responsive and consultative approach of the Housing 
Authority. There was also similarity in the outcome—a very moderate action 
repertoire. However, it should be cautious that whether the movement 
organizations are strongly developed (as the analysis of Kriesi showed), apart 
from determining by the combination of formal and informal institutional 
structure, depended on the organizations' respective availability of resources. 
Conclusion 
• The comparatively large amount of instances of collective action between 
1991-1995, to a very large extent, was a result of resident groups' retreat from 
the formal institution. The retreat, on the other hand, was caused by resident 
groups' disappointment towards the formal institution, which stemmed from the 
very finite influence of the elected bodies over public housing policies and the 
dissonance with the logic of electoral politics. However, the organizational 
strength or mobilization capacity of resident groups should not be overestimated 
for the revival was more about the quantity of the collective actions rather than 
the quality— most of the actions remained as cadre-oriented as the period before; 
and it remained doubtful of the effect of these non-institutionalized collective 
actions such as press conference and petitions, in the democratized context. 
Therefore, it can be interpreted that the public housing movement was far from 
rejuvenated between 1991-1995. 
In the next chapter, the research will explain why the political opportunities 
96 
structure did not favour the public housing movement from 1991-1995, 
especially its initiations of mass-oriented collective action----the opening of the 
formal institution to accommodate with the democratization process led to the 
proliferation and the emergency of political parties, some of which have taken 
away the potential forces of tenant participation from resident groups. In other 
words, it will demonstrate that the real threat of these political parties to resident 
groups was not that they competed with the latter to persuade tenants to take part 
in their struggles, but was that they absorbed the potential forces of tenant 
mobilization, of which collective grievances were mostly expressed through 
parliamentary or cadre-oriented actions. 
/ 
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Notes 
1 There are several criteria for one to be eligible to vote. He/ She must be 
over 21 years old. He/ She must live in Hong Kong for seven years. He/ She 
must register as a voter. 
2 The resource books by Louie and Shum (1995, 1996) are used to analyze the 
organizational backgrounds of the candidates due to their long coverage and 
completeness. It seems that among the public housing resident groups, only one 
resident group has sent representatives for elections. Nevertheless, since the 
resident group has composed mainly of local organizations rather than 
individuals as members, it can be inferred that candidates having the support of 
the council should also have the support of their own organizations. It was 
probably due to the greater publicity of the council that its name was adopted. 
3 The Estate Management Advisory Committee was first carried out in eight 
estates from April, 1995. Due to its late implementation, it can be inferred that 
the programme has exerted little influence within our period of study. 
4 The term, Kaifongs，is a Cantonese idiom. Literally, it means "those living 
nearby". However, it is usually used to denote public-housing tenants. 
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Chapter 7 
Policy and Strategic Orientations of the Grass-root Oriented 
Political Parties 
The policy and strategic orientations of the grass-root oriented political 
parties, to some extent, helped to account for the rising trend of collective action 
events and the comparatively large amount of cases from 1991 to 1995. Among 
the total of 104 cases during this period, 20 cases were initiated by these political 
parties while there were seven cases involving their joint-actions with resident 
groups. All of the struggles like those initiated by the movement organizations, 
concerned about protecting the rights of tenants, for instance, opposing rent 
increase. 
In the following, the phenomenon of the emergency and the proliferation of 
political parties will be elaborated first. Then it will analyze why the policy and 
strategic orientations led to their active involvement into the struggle for tenants' 
rights. In addition, the kind of challenge posed to the public housing movement 
or to resident groups, will be stated. 
The Emergency and the Proliferation of Political Parties 
According to Miners(1995), two quasi-political groups were formed in the 
post-war Hong Kong. They were the Reform Club (founded in 1949) and the 
Civic Association (founded in 1956). Nevertheless, political parties have 
become more prevalent and influential only since the early 90's. 
The United Democrats of Hong Kong was the first political party formed in 
April, 1990. It consisted mostly of members who came from three 
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organizations that were formed in the 80，s——the Hong Kong Affairs Society, 
Meeting Point and, the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's 
Livelihood. Another two parties, i.e., the Hong Kong Democratic Foundation 
and, the Liberal Democratic Federation were also formed respectively in May 
and in November 1990. A year after the 1991 elections, the Liberal party was 
established. The Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong also 
came into existence in 1992. In May 1994，the Meeting Point and the United 
Democrats of Hong Kong agreed to merge into a new single party---- the 
Democratic Party. 
There are obvious peculiarities of the party system of Hong Kong when 
viewed in the light of their western counterparts. Political parties in the 
territory cannot become the governing party through the capture of political 
offices by winning elections. Their functions are, through their elected 
members, to advise, criticize and, block proposals put forward by the government. 
Besides, the appointment system also makes it possible for some citizens 
particularly those from business and professional sectors, to acquire political 
offices without the need to campaign in elections. 
Among the various political parties, the Democratic Party is usually 
classified as a member of the liberal camp with a grass-root orientation. On the 
other hand, the Liberal Party is considered as a conservative force representing 
business interests. Albeit the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and 
People's Livelihood has never proclaimed itself as a political party, it is usually 
regarded as a political party that acts on the behalf of the grass-root. The 
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong is a pro-China party of 
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which the inauguration was supported by the Xiuhua News Agency. 
The Policy Orientation of the Political Parties 
The involvement of these grass-root oriented political parties into the 
struggle for tenants' rights were largely related to their stances on housing policy 
which, must be admitted that, possessed slight difference with resident groups 
(see table 2). 
Table 2. Stances on Housing Policy of the United Democrats of 
Hong Kong (UDHK), the Hong Kong Association for Democracy & 
People's Livelihood (HKADPL), and the Hong Kong People's 
Council on Public Housing Policies (HKPCPHP) 
—HKPCP (NOTE 4 ) UDHK HKADPL 
1. Government be Government be Government should 
responsible for public responsible for public provide sufficient 
housing as social housing as social rental housing units 
security service for economic deprived 
& poor living 
environment 
2. Government In developing & Government to 
intervention in utilizing lands, provide sufficient 
building housing units government should housing for middle & 
to regulate prices of consider needs of lower class to balance 
private sector citizens & regulate inefficiency of the 
prices of private market 
sector 
3. Citizen be able to Structure and process Strengthen citizen 
participate in housing of housing policy participation in 
policy & monitor making be more open housing policy 
& democratic making to ensure the 
policy not to violate 
from need of citizens 
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Note. From "The Development of Political Parties and the Impact on 
Community Organizing" by Kwok Ngai Kuen, 1992, Community Resource 
Book 1991-1992, p34. 
Strategic Orientation of the Political Parties 
More effort has been put forward by the grass-root orientated political 
parties to establish their power bases in public housing estates. The Democratic 
Party and, the Democratic Association for People's Democracy and Livelihood, 
for example, supported a much larger percentage of members to campaign in 
constituencies in which the major type of residential area were public housing 
estates, in the 1994 District Board Election (see figure 17). 
Figure 17. Respective Number and Percentage of Candidates Sent by 
Three Political Parties to Campaign in “Public-Housing-Estate 
Constituencies" (PHC) and, “Non-Public-Housing-Estate 
Constituencies" (NPHC) 
Political Party Number & Percentage Number & Percentage 
of to Campaign in PHC to Campaign in 
NPHC 
Democratic Party 64 (52%) 59 (48%) 
HKADPL 23 (68%) 11 (32%) 
Liberal Party 20 (26%) 58 (74%) 
Note. Combined by the author from the Resource Books of Hong Kong 
Elections, 1982-1994, & 1995 edited by Louie Kin Shuen and Shum Kwok 
Cheung (1994 and 1995). 
Their target at public housing tenants as the major patrons was based on the 
reason that half of the population of Hong Kong has been living in public 
housing estates. In addition, the comparatively high density of housing blocks 
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also made it more efficient and effective to mobilize support. 
Nevertheless, there was a more substantial cause that not only determined 
the strategic but also the policy orientations of these parties---- most of their 
leading members were originally pressure group activists. The majority of 
pressure groups had existed well before channels for mass political participation 
were open, and has act as an opposition force to articulate the view of the grass-
root to the government (Louie, 1991). Following the inauguration of the 
District Board in 1981，some of the activists began to cast their participation in 
the formal institution and to take part actively in the debate concerning the future 
of Hong Kong. Noticeable examples included Fung Kin Kee who was once the 
chief secretary of the Hong Kong People's Council on Public Housing Policy and, 
Lee Wing Tat and his associates who had been working in the Kwai Chung and 
Tsuen Wan districts. 
The above background of these political parties has made them more 
favourable to compete in constituencies consisting mainly of public housing 
estates, as compared with parties of business and professional origins. It was 
because activism by pressure or resident groups in public estates has been a 
tradition since the 70's, and these parties as a continual of pressure groups, were 
in fact harvesting the returns long cultivated (Louie, 1991). Besides, the 
techniques of organizing tenants with which their members were familiar, 
enhanced their advantage to contest there. 
Hence, it is not astounding that resemble tactics or work approach such as 
surveys, home visits, residents meeting and protests have been employed. The 
analysis of Kwok (1992:35) demonstrated the close similarities between an 
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election campaign for a politician and the process model used by a community 
worker: 
Table 3. Similarities between an Election Campaign and the Process 
Model 
p " " " " J ^ ^ ^ ^ “ E L E C T I O N " ^ ^ C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S 
STAGES CAMPAIGN OF PROCESS 
INTERVENTION 
MODEL 
Entering (a) analysis & select (a) analysis of 
constituency community 
(b) seek support from (b) relationship 
community leaders building 
Organizing (a) formation of (a) establish structure 
campaign team (b) alternatives 
(b) campaigning (c) decision 
theme & strategies 
(c) mobilization of 
volunteers 
Implementation (a) promotion tactics (a) strategies 
(b) action 
Evaluation (a) assessment (a) assessment of 
(b) adjustment information 
(c) decision-making 
Termination (a) election day tactics (a) leaving the 
community 
Note. From "The Development of Political Parties and the Lmpact on 
Community Organizing" by Kwok Ngai Kuen, 1992, Community Resource 
Book 1991-1992, p35. 
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Other Purposes of Initiating Collective Actions 
Revealed by chapter four, poHtical parties have shown less eagerness to 
resort to collective actions than resident groups. Even this kind of action mode 
was sought, the collective actions were more cadre-oriented and institutionalized. 
More importantly, even though collective actions were initiated by the political 
parties, their underlying intentions were dissimilar with those of the movement 
organizations. Besides, there was also different perception with regard to the 
role of tenants. 
Non-institutionalized collective actions particularly possessions and 
petitions were usually regarded as “next-best options" which were used when 
institutionalized channels failed to produce or were expected to be unable to 
produce the desired result. A party member said: 
First of all, we will try to arrange a meeting with the relevant department or 
express our views through the parliaments. We will stage protests only if we 
fmd them ignoring our claims. The main function of which is to exert 
pressure to the government by arousing the attention of the mass media. We 
do not intend to raise our action level as long as there are signs of 
responsiveness. 
Apart from reflecting policy suggestions or discontents, the initiations of 
collective action by the political parties serve another purpose---- they prepare 
party members especially those lacking experience and publicity, ready for 
elections. It was expected to create an image of diligence and long time 
participation in community affairs for them. Moreover, techniques of 
articulating large-scale and community issues were also anticipated to be 
acquired. An interviewee working in one of the political parties said: 
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It is simply impossible to express everything through the parliaments. We 
have to hold some actions in order to bring other non-elected members to the 
limelight. They are usually led by one or several Legco Councillors whom 
we nickname as "big brothers，，. We do not anticipate these novices to 
become famous or ready to campaign within a few months. But such type 
of action is more frequently held, the closer it is to an election. 
Beside purpose, the political parties and organizations of the public housing 
movement differed from each other in their perceptions of the role of tenants in 
the collective struggle. The previous chapter (chapter seven) stated that resident 
groups depended on the active participation of the affected tenants in the 
collective action. Participation was regarded as a continual process of which 
the aims included not merely solving the problem but also fostering the 
consciousness of the participants. On the other hand, tenant participation was 
considered less necessary from the perspective of the political parties. Tenants 
were expected to count on and to tell problems to their elected representatives 
whom will do the job for them. A District Board member said: 
We will require them to join us only in very serious issues about which we 
find the government employs a neglecting attitude. 
The variance in perception, apart from stemming from the discrepancy 
between the logic of mass participation and the logic of electoral politics, as 
previously explained, were also based on practical considerations. The same 
interviewee explained: 
We are less inclined to ask tenants to join our actions because we do not want 
to disturb their daily livelihood. Besides, if you want to persuade them to 
come out, you will inevitably raise their expectation. Then problems will 
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arise such as blaming you of incompetence and wasting their time, if the 
problem cannot be solved. Therefore, we would prefer to do the job 
ourselves and report to them later by posters or mass meetings. 
Another District Board member put it: 
Tenants are very realistic. They elect us because they anticipate us to 
represent their interests. Thus, will they choose us again if we always 
persuade them to abandon their work and leisure time to come out? 
Main Methods Used by the Political Party 
It is revealed that the grass-oriented political parties had a greater propensity 
to raise public-housing issues through parliamentary means. Despite of their 
minority status in the Legislative Council, a large percentage of inquiries were 
put forth by them as shown in the below figure. 
Figure 18. Percentage and Number of Inquiries Put Forward by 
Councillors from the Grass-oriented Political Parties 
Year Percentage of Questions Asked Number 
1991-1992 ^ ^ 
1992-1993 53% 16 
1993-1994 81% 13 
1994-199 5 ^ ^2 
Note. Combined by the author from the Legislative Council Proceedings 1991-
涵 . 
Most distinguishable was that these parties have made use of non-official 
motions to express their views or to call on the government to take certain 
actions particularly when far-reaching policies were concerned. Seen from the 
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table below, all except one motion were put forth by councillors from the grass-
root oriented political parties. Even the one from Wong Wang Fat was 
amended by the chairman of the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and 
People's Livelihood. 
Table 4. Motions Concerning Public Housing Putting- Forth by 
Councillors from the Grass-root Oriented Parties 
YEAR NAME OF THE| WORDINGS OF THE MOTION 
COUNCILLOR 
^ 
1991-1992 Lee Wing Tat That the council urges the Housing 
Authority to widely consult the public 
in reviewing the objective, pricing 
maintenance, management, and othei 
aspects in connection with the sale of 
Public housing units to sitting tenants. 
1992-1993 Lee Wing Tat That~~thIs council urges Ae 
Government to revoke the Housing 
Subsidy Policy (Double Rent Policy) 
of the Housing Authority. 
1992-1993 Fung Kin Kee~~~ That~~~thIs council urges 5ie 
Government to revise its existing 
financial arrangements with the Hong 
Kong Housing Authority, including 
the waiving of payment of interest 
and dividends and a reduction in the 
current excessive land development 
charges in order to allow th^  
Authority to have more resources tc 
introduce environmental 
improvement measures in public 
housing estates; and to increase the 
supply of land for public housing, sc 
that the Authority can build more 
— — - - g g g = ^ = ^ ^ = s ^ ^ = ^ ^ ^ = s ^ B s a ^ ^ = a � s = s a a a : ^ ^ s s s ^ ^ ^ ^ s s s s ^ 
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public housing units to meet the 
pressing demand of the public. 
1992-1993 Fung Chi Wood That in view of the fact tha 
considerable improvement is called 
for on such matters as law and order, 
cleanliness, sanitation, and 
management in public rental and 
Home Ownership Scheme estates, this 
council urges the Housing Authority 
to expeditiously conduct a detailed 
review of these matters, propose 
measures for improvement, anc 
publish its findings in a report foi 
public consultation. 
1992-1993 Lee Wing Tat~~~ That~~~thIs~~~Council~~urges~~the 
Government to meet the housing 
needs of the middle and lower income 
groups by promptly developing 
adequate sites for private and public 
housing, so as to increase the quantitj 
of both private and public housing 
developments. 
i 
1993-1994 Lam Kui Shing This Council urges the Housing 
(Fung Kin Kee) Authority, in formulating it$ 
recommendations in the Report on 
Mid- Term Review of the Long Tern 
Housing Strategy, to adopt the public 
rental housing oriented approach in 
the provision of public sector housing 
so as to solve the housing problems oi 
the middle and lower social strata. 
1994-1995 Wong Wang Fat That in view of the dire need fo 
(Fung Kin Kee) public rental housing as evidenced by 
the fact that ‘some 150,000 families 
are on the Waiting List，and that the 
Waiting List is still growing, this 
Council welcome, as a start, thc 
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Government's 1994 Policy 
Committee target to ‘build an 
additional 141,000 public rental flats 
before April 2001,’ and urges th( 
Government to inject before July 
1997 at least an additional 90 hectares 
of land into the Housing Authority foi 
the construction of public housing in 
order to satisfy the said need. 
1994-1995 Lam Kui Shing That, in view of the deterioration o ‘ 
(Howard Young) the unemployment problem coupled 
(Fung Kin Kee) with the rising inflation rate, thh 
Council urges the Government to 
immediately freeze various fees and 
charges of Government services 
public housing rentals and railways 
fares for one year in order to alleviat( � 
the burden of the general public. 
Note. Combined by the author from the Annual Reports of the Legislative 
^ n c i l 1991-1995. 
Challenge Posed by the Political Parties 
It is evinced that the grass-root oriented political parties have possessed a 
greater propensity to resort to cadre-oriented and parliamentary actions to voice 
out tenants' interests, rather than encouraging them to participate actively in a 
collective struggle (see chapter four). Hence, it can be inferred that what kind 
of challenge has these political parties' penetrations into public housing estates 
and public housing issues really posed to resident groups---- they have taken 
away and incorporated the potential force of tenant participation through their 
elected members. An organizer of a resident group offered a typical answer: 
Tenants no longer make their complaints to us. It is very strenuous for us to 
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initiate any action now for not many tenants will take part even very serious 
issues are involved. Most of them will go to the so-called ‘liberal camp’ 
District Board members or councillors for assistance. 
The analysis is also supported by some statistical figures. Fung (1993) 
showed that 38.3 % and 9.5 % respondents would count on District Board 
members and Legco councillors for assistance respectively when complaining, 
still 12.8 % would choose pressure groups for help. At the same time, it is more 
accurately to say that tenants relied on members of these political parties to voice 
out their demands because of the latter's legal legitimacy, i.e., they were 
recognized by the government as their representatives, rather than due to the fact 
that they were party identifiers or held any loyalty to these grass-root oriented 
parties. 
The legal legitimacy acquired through their elected members undeniably, 
functioned as a competitive advantage. It helped them to make quicker 
reactions well before resident groups could garner enough tenants or initiate any 
actions. It was because the elected members could get information in advance 
by questioning to government departments, or through informal networks built 
up with officials (Kwok, 1992). This advantage applied not merely to territorial 
but also to local issues that were related to central policies. In addition, the 
relatively well-off fmancial condition, of which elected members' enumeration 
consisted of a major part of the revenue, also made them capable of employing 
more staff, and thus, able to have finer quality of argument and faster responses. 
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Case Studies 
Two case studies are implemented in order to understand various 
relationship patterns between poUtical parties and resident groups. Both of the 
two parties were grass-root oriented. The first case involves a resident group 
that has maintained a close relationship with a political party, or put more 
precisely with one of its elected member. The second case involves a resident 
group, which has tried to remain independent from its allying political party. 
Table 5 Background Information of the Resident Groups 
NAME RESIDENT GROUP RESIDENT GROUP 
A B 
Year of Formation 1 ^ l 9 ^ 
Number of Member About 3000 members About 400 members 
30 committee 20 committee 
members members 
Original Aim of the To fight for To fight for 
Organization improvement of the improvement of the 
living conditions living conditions 
Natures of activities Recreational & Recreational & 
that were recently held welfare: 80 % welfare: 70 % 
Housing Issues: 10 % Housing Issues: 30 % 
Staff employed No Two full-time staff 
Income Membership fee Membership fee 
Fund from the District Fund from the District 
Board Board 
Donation Charity Organization 
Relationship with the Close Distant 
political party 
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Resident Group A was established with the help of a political party in the early 
90's at a time when tenants have just moved in the new housing estate. A 
member from the political party, who was also a schoolteacher there, has act as 
the organization's advisor. However, instead of merely offering suggestions, 
the teacher played an active role in initiating activities of Resident Group A with 
the assistance of the political party. Its original aim was to tackle the various 
livelihood problems encountered by the tenants, for instance, inadequate 
transport facilities. A complaint hotline was established for the newly moved-in 
tenants to express their discontent. Moreover, with regard to its strategic 
function, Resident Group A act as a bridge for the political party to maintain 
regular contact with tenants there. It claimed to have about 3000 members and 
30 committee members, but only about ten of them were active at the present. 
In 1994, the teacher won in the District Board Election. 
What deserving the greatest attention was that according to information 
provided by Resident Group A，there was a remarkable change in the nature of 
the activities held. During the years of 1992 and 1993, about 70 % of the 
activities held were about livelihood affairs such as inadequate school places and 
sub-standard water quality, while the remaining 30 % aimed at providing 
recreation and welfare to the tenants, e.g., picnics. However, from 1994 
onwards, change occurred to the proportion of the two kinds of activities held. 
In the year of 1995, about 80 % items were recreational in nature. Factors 
leading to such change will be analyzed immediately. 
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Factors Leading to the Change 
The proportion of activities about livelihood problems was greatly reduced 
because the problems were now "passed" to the office of District Board member 
to handle. The chairman of Resident Group A, who was also a committee 
member of the office explained: 
We will use the name of the District-Board-Member office to hold actions 
concerning livelihood matters. Since Mr. Chan (pseudonym) is the District 
Board member of our estate, it is simply illogical if we do not cooperate with 
him and use his title to initiate this type of action. If the matter involved is 
not too political, we will sometimes expose the name of Resident Group A as 
well. 
From the perspective of the District Board member, it was no longer 
necessary to take every action with Resident Group A. The recognized status 
and the fact that tenants would directly complain to him but not to Resident 
Group A now (Resident Group A has cancelled its complain hotline two year ago) 
enabled him to take action alone in the name of himself or with his own political 
party. Furthermore, more effective and efficient responses could be made for 
he did not need to symbolically consult the committee member of Resident 
Group A. In addition, it was also necessary for him to differentiate himself 
from Resident Group A by another reason: 
You have to use your own name. If you still stick to you allying 
organization, there may be the danger that tenants cannot recognize what you 
have done individually for them as their elected representatives. 
The change to stress on the provisions of welfare and recreational services, 
was as well due to the feeling of inefficacy of its committee members towards 
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housing and other government issues as well. One of them expressed: 
By now, most issues are either improved or cannot be altered because of 
established policies. We have, for instance, demanded No XX Bus 
(pseudonym) to pass through our estate for years. We even took days off 
and petitioned with Mr. Chan about it. However, the motor company replied 
by saying that the fare must have been raised; otherwise, it did not agree with 
us. The Transport Department did not consent with our idea. It is a waste 
of time and effort to think of them anymore. 
Their feeling of inefficacy was also intensified by certain objective 
conditions. They did not have the time and the knowledge to engage in policy 
analysis. Beside, the committee members began to take part in community 
work only when they joined Resident Group A. In addition, they lacked the 
recognized status or the legal legitimacy to have easy access with government 
officials and information. On the other hand, the provisions of recreational and 
welfare services demanded less expertise knowledge and skill. More 
importantly, they brought quicker and more palpable yields to the tenants. The 
chairman of Resident Group A put it frankly: 
Providing recreational and welfare services can give us a greater sense of 
satisfaction. We can have more control. 
When asked about the future plan for Resident Group A, nothing was 
related to tackling with housing or other livelihood issues. The chairman 
continued: 
We want an independent venue so that we can sell some products to our 
members below the market price. 
It should not be overestimated that the District Board member did possess 
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individually much more resources to enable him to make better policy analysis. 
His comparative advantage lied in the fact that he could depend on the political 
party's central office to provide the background information and the framework 
of analysis for him. He could also act collectively with other elected members 
from the same party, whose constituencies encountered similar problems as well. 
Conditions Making the Co-optation Possible 
Resident Group A was, to a very large extent, co-opted by the political party. 
The co-optation was manifested as the fact that it would cooperate with other 
tenant bodies in the estate to organize joint-functions, e.g., fun-fair parties; but it 
would never work with an organization that was set up by another political party. 
The chairman of Resident Group A said: 
They are sure which political party we are affiliated with. Thus, they will 
not approach us and we will not approach them. 
Several conditions made the co-optation possible. The majority of the 
active committee members of Resident Group A (a total of seven), including 
the chairman, were also committee members of the District Board member's 
office. Beside, the committee members of Resident Group A were free to use 
the office's material and the venue for meetings. In addition, the District board 
member would donate money to sponsor Resident Group A's activities. A 
problem was brought by the sponsorship as the District board member said: 
I want to be fair to the Mutual Aid Committees also. Therefore, I will 
sponsor their functions as well. In festive times and in the summer vacation, 
I have to make donations more often and sometimes my allowance is not 
enough to cover my expenses. I have to give the money myself. 
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The analysis above reveals one of the possible relationship dynamics 
between political parties and resident groups---- a political party would establish 
a resident group in order to penetrate into a estate and garner electoral support; 
however, after the party's member was elected, the functions of the resident 
group were much more reduced, remaining as a body chiefly to cater for the 
recreational and welfare needs of tenants. 
Case 2 
Resident Group B was formed in the early 80's well before the emergency 
of political parties. Its formation was assisted by a community service agency 
to deal with redevelopment issues. It claimed to have about 400 members and 
20 committee members. Two ftill-time staffs were employed. 
There were two particularities of Resident Group B when compared to 
Resident Group A，about which the research will analyze. First, it will elaborate 
why Resident Group B could remain as comparatively independent from its 
allying political party. Second, it will explain why Resident Group B would 
concentrate on the provisions of recreational and welfare services like Resident 
Group A, despite of the fact that the former did have a longer history in fighting 
for tenants' rights and relatively abundant resources to do so. 
Reasons for the Capability to Remain a More Distant Relationship 
Resident Group B was more independent than Resident Group A, 
manifesting as its high level of policy autonomy, i.e., it has not held joint-action 
with the allying political party for about three years. This independence, to a 
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large extent, was a result of their stable financial condition. It has been 
sponsored by a charitable agency, which enabled it to maintain its own office and 
employed two fiill-time staffs. Thus, it did not need to maintain a "close and 
cooperative" relationship with its allying political party in order to obtain the 
necessary material resources. A committee member said proudly: 
We have resources. We do not need to follow them (elected members of the 
political party who was originally member of Resident Group B). We have 
"expelled" them (told them to find another office for themselves actually). 
But to other resident groups that are in dearth of financial support, I am afraid 
they cannot do so. Thanks for the charitable agency! 
On the other hand, it should be realized that close affiliations with any 
political bodies were strictly forbidden by the charitable agency. 
An Incomplete Independent 
In spite of its higher degree of autonomy, Resident Group B still depended 
on the allying political party to nominate its committee members into the various 
committees of their respective District Board, through the latter's elected 
members. At present, six of them were serving as co-opt members in the 
District board. Even the above interviewee praised the advantages: 
First of all, we can get quicker and more accessibility of information. 
Besides, we can get to know a lot more people and thus, have a broader pool 
of people we know about. As long as conditions allow, we will continue to 
send our committee members to these committees. 
However, the mutual distrust relationship between Resident Group B and 
the political party tended to be more intensified and palpable after the nomination 
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of the committee members into the District Board. An elected member from the 
allying party expressed: 
They should have made use of this valuable chance to express their suggestions. 
But seldom do they say something. On the one hand, they always ask us (she 
and her colleagues) to put forth agendas for discussions. On the other hand, 
they are afraid us of 'stealing the show，. When we suggest them to say 
certain points in the board meetings, they are afraid that we cheat them or play 
tricks on them. What a dilemma! 
Conversion to Provide Recreational & Welfare Services 
Another particularity of Resident Group B was its conversion to a 
recreational and social service body. Once was an active group in fighting for 
the improvement of tenants' living conditions, 70 % of its activities were now 
about recreational and welfare provisions, while the remaining 30 % were about 
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livelihood affairs such as holding mass meetings about the double-rent policy, as 
revealed by a committee member. It seemed that Resident Group B possessed 
more favourable conditions to stay as a resident group chiefly fighting for 
tenants' rights than Resident Group A. It was because its committee members 
were more experienced in this aspect. Beside, it had closer connection with 
other resident groups. Furthermore, it had two full-time staffs and its own 
office to implement activities. 
The conversion was partly a result of the absorption of tenants' complains 
by its allying grass-root political party or their elected members, as expressed by 
the committee member: 
In the past, our group was the chief force in fighting for tenants' rights and 
119 
helped them to improve their conditions. I began to participate in the late 
70's.... Tenants do not complain to us anymore. In these years, they had 
gone to the District Board members or councillors for assistance. 
The following explanation by an experienced social worker offers us 
another perspective to understand the goal displacement: 
Some resident groups were formed mainly to tackle redevelopment issues. 
However, after tenants moved into newly built units, those redevelopment 
issues cease to exist and fewer problems involving living conditions are 
encountered. In order to maintain the organization, recreational and other 
welfare services must be held continuously to keep members from leaving. 
In order to provide the services, they must apply for sponsorship from 
charitable agencies. 
Implications of the Two Cases 
Despite of the uniqueness of Organizations A and B, certain common 
features can still be drawn from them, which can help us to understand other 
resident groups as well. 
Vulnerability of Resident Groups as Movement Organizations 
The two cases demonstrate the vulnerability of resident groups as public 
housing movement organizations or its participants. Unlike political parties, 
they are not designated and obliged to keep surveillance on housing and other 
government policies in order to obtain the necessary publicity and electoral 
support. They may be originally established to tackle various livelihood 
problems. However, they are very likely to shift their emphasis to recreational 
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and welfare provisions, especially, when there was a strong feeling of inefficacy 
of their committee members, and when they tried to persuade tenants from 
leaving the organization. 
Viewed in the perspective of these organizations, providing the above 
mentioned services tends to be more attractive than keeping a check on 
government policies. It is because they are capable to exert more control. 
Beside, a sense of satisfaction and palpable results are yielded. 
The Matter of Legal legitimacy 
Owing to their refusal or inability to participate in electoral politics, resident 
groups cannot enjoy the legal legitimacy that will enable them to have efficient 
and effective access to government information and officials. Such problem 
might be alleviated by allying with a political party. Then members of a 
resident group may join with the allying party's elected members to discuss 
matter of concerns with government officials, or to obtain information through 
the elected members (like what Organization has done). On the other hand, 
they can be nominated by elected politicians to become co-opt members of the 
District Boards (like what Resident Group B has done). But these two methods 
are inevitably subject to strategic considerations of the political party that is not 
necessarily willed to do so, for instance, they may nominate their own members. 
The recently implemented Estate Management Advisory Committee 
(EMAC) may shed light on this problem. The status of a resident group is 
recognized by having a representative to participate in the committee. This 
scheme enables them to have better communication with the managers in their 
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own estates. The chairman of Resident Group A commented: 
Before I join the committee, the manager is not quite willing to meet us 
alone without Mr. Chan (the District Board member). Now our 
relationship is better and I can have easier access to him. Even he is not 
available, I can tell his secretary about the matter at hand. 
Nevertheless, to be eligible, a resident group must have a certain proportion 
of tenants of the estate as members (Resident Group B failed to fulfill this 
criterion). The ESMC is advisory in nature and thus, has no real power. 
Whether their opinions are accepted depend on the considerations of the 
managers, which are in turn according to established housing policies. 
The Source of the Resources 
Albeit political opportunities structure should not be made identical with 
resources in order to avoid analytical ambiguity, the availability of resources is 
also important in determining the development of a resident group, as illustrated 
by the two case studies. According to the resource mobilization approach (for 
example, McCarthy, 1977), external support is crucial to a movement 
organization. However, apart from stressing on whether resources are acquired, 
attention should also be paid to the source of the resources. It is because the 
source not only affects the nature of the support available, but also the type of 
constraint associated. Case one revealed that since Resident Group A depended 
on the political party as its patron, it had to maintain a stance which was very 
similar to that of the political party, for example, Resident Group A would not 
cooperate with the resident body established by another political party. Case 2 
showed that since Resident Group B depended on the charitable agency as its 
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patron, it was constrained by the regulation of the charitable agency, which 
forbidden affiliation with any political bodies and the sending of members to 
campaign in elections. 
Conclusion 
The chapter demonstrates that the strategic and policy orientations of the 
grass-root political parties accounted for their involvement into the struggle for 
tenants' rights. However, the political parties were less eager to implement 
collective actions as it was usually thought. The real challenge of the political 
parties to the public housing movement or resident groups was that they absorbed 
the potential force of tenant participation, but not in competing with resident 
groups to persuade tenants to join their actions. The case studies imply the 
vulnerability of resident groups as participants of the public housing movement 
and the problem of their legitimacy, as well as the need to focus on the source of 
support. It was not to exaggerate the strength of the grass-root political parties. 
But it could not be denied that they were more advantageous in the public-
housing arena under the democratized context. 
With regard to the analysis of the previous chapter (chapter 7), it should be 
more accurate to say that resident groups have never established a strong 
foundation, the emergency of the grass-root oriented political parties was just 
intensifying and making it more obvious of their already jeopardized situation. 
The chapter can also shed light on the phenomenon that the grass-root 
political parties were less eager to hold joint-action with resident groups as 
revealed by chapter four despite of their opposition status. It was because they 
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were more inclined to take cadre-oriented actions, or raised issues through 
institutionalized channels especially through the parliaments. 
Having elaborated that the grass-root oriented political parties have 
absorbed the potential force of tenant participation, by which collective 
grievances were mainly solved through the employment of parliamentary and 
cadre-oriented actions, the chapter, thus, accounts for the other side of the 
paradox----why the political opportunities structure did not favour the initiations 
of mass-oriented collective action by the public housing movement. 
In the next chapter, the research will study another group of actors that rose 
or protruded to the political arena during the late transition period---- the pro-
China resident organizations. 
* 
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Chapter 8 
Changes in the Political Alignment: the Protrusions of Pro-China 
Resident Organizations 
The rising trend of collective action events and the comparatively large 
annual number of cases from 1991-1995, to a certain extent, were also caused by 
a factor that was unique to the Hong Kong context. It was the protrusions of 
pro-China resident organizations as a result of the transfer of sovereignty to 
China in 1997. 
In the following, these organizations will be briefly described first. Then it 
will analyze why they jut out into the struggle for tenants' rights. The 
particularities of these organizations will be elaborated later. 
A Brief Description 
The collective action events recorded were initiated in the name of 
Organization C (pseudonym) that was also a federation of 28 leftist district-level 
resident organizations. According to their senior staffs, joint-action would be 
carried out in the name of Organization C with regard to public housing policies 
especially when they were germane to policy or territorial issues. But the 
district-level organizations maintained their independence in provisions of 
recreational and welfare services. 
Most of them had a long history of existence. Organization C was 
established in 1985 while one of its affiliating organizations, for instance, was 
formed in the late 50's. However, they tended to maintain a very low profile 
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prior to the early 90's. From 1985 to 1990, the research has recorded only two 
cases that were initiated by Organization C, occurring respectively in the years of 
1985 and 1986. 
The 28 affiliating or district-level resident organizations covered a large part 
of the territory particularly the Kowloon Peninsula. 17 of them located in 
Kowloon; the other seven located in Hong Kong and the remaining four located 
in the New Territories. 
The Protrusion of Pro-China Resident Organizations 
The protrusions of these pro-China resident organizations were not confined 
to the domain of collective action, but also to the formal institution, which were 
manifested as their participation in the District Board Elections. 
From 1993 onwards, about 30 % of the collective action events recorded 
were initiated by Organization C (see figure 19). With regard to the events it 
held, half of them involved close-door discussions with representatives from the 
Housing Authority. 
Figure 19. Percentage of Collective Actions Initiated by Pro-China 
Resident Organizations 
Year Percentage 
~Tm f % ~ ~ 
1992 
1993 30 % 
1994 27 % 
1995 33 % 
Note. Combined by the author from newspaper clippings provided by the 
Catholics Communication Center and the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies. 
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A change to high profile and more massive participation was witnessed on 
the district-level resident organizations in the recent District Board Election held 
in 1994 (see figure 20). In the 1992 District Board Election, there were just two 
pro-China candidates revealing the name of their respective organizations. 
However, in the next election in 1994, the number rose substantially to a total of 
31 candidates. 20 of them won in the campaign with a successful rate of 65 %, 
which was higher than the 56.4 % of the Democratic Party and the 44.6 % of the 
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (Louie and Shum, 1996). 
Figure 20 Participation of Pro-China Resident Organizations in the 
1994 District Board Election 
District No. of candidates sent No. of candidates succeed 
(%) 
Yau-Tsim-Mong 2 1 (50%) 
Sham Shui Po 3 2 (67%) 
Kowloon City 2 2 (100%) 
Kwun Tong 13 7 (54%) 
Wong Tai Sin 11 8(73%) 
Note. Combined by the author from the Resource Books of Hong Kong 
Ekctions, 1982-1994, & 1995 edited by Louie Kin Shuen and Shum Kwok 
Cheung (1994 and 1995). 
Reason for Their Protrusions 
An interview from Organization C attributed to their active participation 
since 1993 as a result of the increasing deprivation of tenants' rights by the 
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government. However, it should be realized that this explanation has little 
relevance with the jut-out of these leftist resident organizations. It was because 
if the level of seriousness of public housing issues had been the determining 
factor, they should have come out much earlier in the mid 80's, at the time when 
the controversial rent subsidy policy, i.e., the double-rent policy, was to be 
ratified. 
Their protrusion actually can be understood as part of the pro-China camp's 
effort to have more active involvement in the political and livelihood affairs of 
Hong Kong during the late transition period, and in order to forge a more 
concerning and practical image to win support. Also in 1992, a new pro-China 
political party was inaugurated with the support of the Xinhua news agency----
the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong. The party was 
established to unite leftist political forces and to averse the reoccurrence of the 
painful defeat of pro-China interests in the 1991 Legislative Council Election.^ 
It also initiated five of the total collective action events recorded by the research 
that were all cadre-oriented. 
It was not astounding for pro-China forces to take part in the domain of 
public housing. They shared similar reasons of participation with the liberal 
camp. More than half of the population has been living in public housing 
estates. Beside, their high density made it easier to mobilize support and gain 
publicity. More importantly, like the liberal camp, the pro-China forces have a 
long history of community work in public housing estates. What they differed 
from the latter was that they tended to put more emphasis on recreational and 
welfare activities, while the latter's founding members were fighting for the 
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improvement of tenants' living conditions, during the 70's and the 80's. 
However, a close linkage has been maintained by these forces with many of the 
Mutual Aid Committees. 
It can also be understood that had the Tiananmen Square Incident not 
happened, they could have come out earlier. It was because the image of the 
leftists was severely destroyed in a few years following the incident. 
The Particularities of Pro-China Resident Organizations 
There was another reason for the pro-China resident organizations to 
deserve individual attention---- certain particularities were possessed by them as 
compared to those resident groups that were usually adopted as the units of 
analysis. 
The pro-China resident organizations tended to show a tolerant attitude 
towards the penetrations of pro-China political parties. Many of their 
committee members and chairpeople were members of the Democratic Alliance 
for the Betterment of Hong Kong and some of them belonged to the Democratic 
Foundation of Hong Kong. But it was opaque to understand the criteria of 
which label was to be exposed both in elections and in the course of the 
collective actions. 
They also maintained a better relationship with the Housing Authority. 
Both the chairperson of the Housing Authority and the Housing Secretary 
expressed their gratitude in the ten-year memoir of Organization C. The 
relationship was possible because one of their chairpeople was also member of 
the Housing Authority. Three of their committee members were members of 
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the co-opted committees of the Housing Authority. The relationship enabled 
them to have easier access to representatives to discuss matters of concern. An 
interviewee admitted: 
Representatives from the Housing Authority are more willing to engage in 
discussions with us because we adopt a rational and practical attitude. But 
undoubtedly, since we have members serving in the Housing Authority, it is 
more responsive to us. 
Apart from taking part in formal institution, their pro-China position made 
them capable of reflecting their opinions directly to the Chinese Government, 
through visits to Beijing. Beside, 20 of their members were Hong Kong Affairs 
Advisors and another 100 members were the Community Affairs Advisors.^ 
They were more abundant in resources. Three full-time staffs were hired 
by Organization C that also had its own office. An interviewee from 
Organization C revealed that it obtained a total of $700 thousand donation fee for 
the year of 1995. In one of its affiliating organization, for instance, five full-
time staffs were employed. Because of their more formal structure and the 
ability to hire staffs to implement their duties such as policy analysis, they should 
be categorized as "organizations" rather than "groups". 
Resident Organizations But Not the Movement Organizations 
The above characteristics made these pro-China resident organizations very 
differed from those resident groups that were usually established with the help of 
social workers in the 70's and the 80's, which were usually regarded as the 
pillars of the public housing movement of Hong Kong. However, given these 
organization's massive involvement in the formal institution; their better 
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relationship with the Housing Authority and with the sovereign of Hong Kong, 
they could hardly fit into the concept of organizations of the public housing 
movement. 
Conclusion 
The protrusions of pro-China resident organizations demonstrated that the 
transfer of sovereignty to China brought about changes even in the power 
configuration of the public-housing arena during the late transition period. 
Despite of these organizations' involvement in the arena of public housing issues, 
very few research have cast their focus on these pro-China resident organizations. 
Future research focus should not only be placed on their initiations of collective 
actions, but also on their participation in other sectors that are related to the 
public housing movement, for instance, the formal institution and the Housing 
Authority. Attention should also be paid on whether they will experience 
similar developmental path like most resident groups, and the relationship 
dynamics with resident groups and their allying political parties. In addition, 
fecund results can also be produced to analyze their interaction with resident 
groups which tend to possess less material resources and less access to the formal 
institution. 
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Notes 
1 In the 1991 Legislative Council Election, five candidates with pro-China 
label were all defeated, winning less than eight per cent of the vote cast (Miners, 
1995). 
2 The appointments of advisors was one of the united front tactics used by the 
Chinese Government to strengthen its local connections (Lam and Lee, 1993). 
The Hong Kong Affairs Advisors consisted chiefly of leading business figures 
and other prominent pro-China Hong Kong people from different business and 
professional sectors, while some of them were past or existing Legislative 
Councillors. The District Affairs Advisors were composed of pro-China 
District Board Members and the pro-China Urban and the Regional Councillors. 
The actual contribution of these advisors remained opaque. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
In the following, the empirical and the theoretical significance will be 
elaborated first. Then the prospects of the three groups of actors---- the resident 
groups, the grass-root oriented politicians and the pro-China resident 
organizations, in the public-housing arena will be analyzed. Suggestions of 
further research will be evinced later. 
Empirical Significance 
The various dimensions of the political opportunities structure elaborated 
previously did help to account for the rising trend of collective action events 
from 1991 to 1995 and the relatively large number of annual cases within the 
same period as witnessed in chapter four. The figures were the combined 
contribution of the retreat of resident groups from the formal institution; the 
policy and the strategic orientations of the grass-root oriented political parties, 
and the protrusions of pro-China resident organizations to coincide with the 
transfer of sovereignty; and the restrictively tolerant position of the government 
towards protests and assemblies. 
Influence of the Political Opportunities Structure on Resident Groups 
In spite of the fecundity of the above image, there was the paradox that the 
political opportunities structure facilitated the launchings of collective actions 
concerning public-housing issues in general, but not favoured the initiation of 
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mass-oriented collective action by the public housing movement in particular, 
especially its initiations of mass-oriented collective actions. On the one hand, 
the tolerant position of the government towards protests and assemblies act as a 
little hindrance when people found it necessary to organize collectively. On the 
other hand, despite of the decision of some resident groups to retreat from the 
formal institution and concentrated back to the initiations of collective actions (as 
revealed in the example of Organization X)，the potential force of tenant 
participation was largely absorbed by the grass-root oriented political parties. 
The absorption was manifested by the fact that, during 1991-1995, the majority 
of collective action events held by resident groups were cadre-oriented, 
composing of not more than 20 participants. In addition, even a committee was 
set up by the Housing Authority to review the double-rent policy in 1992, it was 
shown that the public housing movement could not arouse the kind of ardent 
responses from tenants as those in the years of 1985 and 1986 when the policy 
was first mentioned or revealed. It was because in 1985 and 1986，there were 
all together 28 collective action events that opposed the implementation of the 
double-rent policy, with 16 of them being mass-oriented. In 1992 and 1993，the 
number of collective action events with similar claims was just five while all of 
them were cadre-oriented. 
At the same time, the protrusion of pro-China resident organizations to 
coincide with the transfer of sovereignty，may pose or has posed similar kind of 
challenge to resident groups also, because of their more abundant resources; their 
long history of community work; their possession of elected District Board 
members; and their better relationship with the Housing Authority and the 
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Chinese government. 
The two cases demonstrates the vulnerability of resident groups as pillars of 
the public housing movement under the democratized context, and the problem 
of legitimacy still bothering them due to their refusal or inability to participate in 
the formal political system when the channels of mass political participation 
became more open and enlarged. 
Theoretical Significance 
The research fiirther justifies the need to avoid making political 
opportunities structure identical with resources in analysis OMcAdam, 19896). 
A clearer understanding of how the political opportunities facilitated and 
hindered the public housing movement of Hong Kong is achieved. More 
significantly, it can also be understood that the action repertoire of the movement, 
apart from determining by the availability of resources of the respective resident 
groups, was to a certain extent, influenced by the opportunities structure. The 
low level of propensity of repression of the government, and the informal 
procedure of the Housing Authority to deal with challengers, to a certain extent, 
accounted for the employment of soft and tolerant tactics by the challengers. 
Apart from the above, two strange phenomena can be shed light on by 
distinguishing political opportunities structure from resources in analysis. They 
are cases in which there are few mobilizations in spite of the existence of a 
favourable political opportunities structure; or cases in which the abundant 
resources acquired does not lead to a high level of mobilization. It will be 
shown in the below section that the pro-China resident organizations may have 
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lesser proclivity to hold non-institutionalized collective actions after the 
formation of the Special Administrative Region albeit of their possession of more 
abundant resources. 
The research shows the advantage of adopting the concepts, i.e., cadre-
oriented vs. mass-oriented, to categorize the collective actions studied. Instead 
of merely differentiating various types of collective action, the concepts help one 
to understand the organizational strength or mobilization capacity of the 
organization responsible for initiating the action. In the research, it can be 
understood that the revival of collective actions during 1991-1995 did not imply 
that organizations of the public housing movement were much more strengthened 
than before as most of the actions held were still cadre-oriented, being small in 
scale and demanding less effort to initiate. 
The research also shows that it is necessary to pay serious attention to the 
historical context of a social movement in conceptualizing the political 
opportunities structure. Since conceptualizations of the various dimensions are 
based on a particular social movement in a certain location and time-frame, an 
unconditional application of the dimensions to study another case will lead to the 
problem of being ahistorical, i.e., ignoring the particularities of the case as a 
result of its historical context. In the research, the establishment of the new 
dimension---- the policy and strategic orientations of political parties is necessary 
with regard to the fact that no political parties in Hong Kong could/can become 
the government. More significantly, this new dimension helps to clarify the 
challenge encountered by the public housing movement organizations under the 
democratized context, and the dynamics of the power configuration of the public-
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housing arena. 
Nevertheless, there reveals a dilemma pending to be solved---- how to 
conceptualize the political opportunities structure so that on the one hand, 
adequate consideration is paid to the historical context of a particular case and on 
the other hand, the problem of being too specific which will hinders comparative 
studies, is averted. 
The important role of the state in the analysis of a social movement is also 
revealed. The research shows that how changes in the formal institution by the 
government led to changes in the power configurations of the public housing 
movement. The opening of the formal institution has once drawn the 
participation of resident groups, which gradually facilitated the emergencies of 
grass-root oriented political parties that have taken an active part in issues about 
public housing, and posed challenge to resident groups. 
Besides, the typology of Kriesi (1995) about states and social movements is 
also supported by this case, as revealed in chapter six. A strong state with 
informal facilitation of access does help to account for a very moderate action 
repertoire. However, it should be cautious that whether movement 
organizations are strongly developed, apart from determining by the combination 
of formal and informal institutional structure, also depend on the amount of 
resources each of them can acquire individually. 
Of equal significance is the idea that serious attention should also be placed 
on the interactions between political parties and movement organizations. In 
this research, the establishment of a new dimension, i.e., the policy and strategic 
orientations of a political party, helps us to understand a serious challenge faced 
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by resident groups---- the absorption of tenant mobilization by these parties. 
The study by Maguire (1995) showed that political parties were more 
inclined to form alliances with movement organizations when the former were in 
an oppositional status. However, it is revealed in this research that any close 
alliance was absent between the grass-root oriented parties and resident groups. 
With regard to such conflicting observations, an inference can be made—- a 
political party will be less probable to ally with a movement organization if its 
policy stands are similar to those of the latter. It is because even the political 
party allies with the movement organization, its electoral support will not be 
much more enlarged given the overlapping of their original supporters. On the 
contrary, they are more likely to be rivals in mobilizing support as well as 
making the state to concede. 
Hence, it is not just the similarity of policy stands that positively determined 
whether a political party will seek alliance with a movement organization, other 
factors such as if the cooperation will bring about an increase in electoral support 
should also be considered. 
Prospects of Resident Groups 
In spite of the challenges posed by the grass-root oriented political parties 
and the pro-China resident organizations, the research can still witness certain 
resident groups capable of initiating collective actions particularly those of cadre-
oriented from 1991 to 1995. Hence, it can be inferred that what was/is more 
determining to some of the remaining movement organizations or resident groups 
might/may be the availability of resources including expert knowledge and 
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organizational skills. However, two recent events gave a negative impact on 
this aspect. They were the poor financial condition of the Hong Kong People's 
Council on Public Housing Policy and the disband of the Ecumenical Social 
Services Center. 
On 5th October, 1995，a press conference was held by the Hong Kong 
People's Council on Public Housing Policy to announce of its poor financial 
condition as a result of the ceasing of financial backing from the World Council 
of Churches. It was said that the resident group would prepare to depart from 
its original role of housing rights activists ahd play the role of a social service 
agency to qualify for local funding. In addition, it was also claimed that the 
council has been forced to employ only one full-time and two part-time staffs to 
reduce cost. 
In October, 1996，the Ecumenical Social Services Center was decided to be 
disband by its founding churches on the reason that the center's social workers 
helped to initiate collective actions that were too radical. 
The struggle of survival of the Hong Kong People's Council on Public 
Housing Policy and the disband of the Ecumenical Social Services Center have 
been striking the survival of those local resident groups that have remained as the 
pillars of the public housing movement. It was because these two organizations 
have helped local resident groups to organize actions to fight for tenants rights 
especially when the rights were related to central policies, which were obviously 
lacking the knowledge and the mobilization skills to do so. In addition, they 
have also helped to establish and maintained some resident groups. 
There are two possibilities left for local resident groups. Either can they 
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affiliate with political parties or apply funding from charitable agencies. 
However, no matter which of the possibilities are employed, their role as housing 
right activists will be ceased. Their policy and action autonomy will be 
severely reduced when affiliating with a political party as implied by the example 
of Resident Group A---- they, for instance, are unable to hold joint-actions with 
tenant bodies that are supported by other political parties, and that whether they 
take part in a collective struggle for tenants' rights will depend on the 
"invitation" of the political party. In order to qualify for support by charitable 
agencies, resident groups have to concentrate on the provisions of social and 
welfare services, and avoid those collective struggles that may be perceived as 
too radical� After they get the subsidy, it can be inferred that the incentives 
associated with the provisions of welfare and social services such as the feeling 
of efficacy and more tangible results, will disinterest them to initiate collective 
actions concerning about housing problems or policies. Even for those central 
level resident groups that have shifted their focus to private housing, they still 
encounter similar challenge posed by political parties and leftist organizations. 
Besides, the accessibility to resources and, government information and officials 
are still hampered by their lack of legal legitimacy due to their refusal or inability 
to participate in the formal institution. 
Prospects of the Grass-root Oriented Politicians 
Although their strength in influencing housing policies should not be over-
estimated, political parties are in a more advantageous position in the 
democratized context because of their availability and accessibility to resources, 
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information, government officials and representatives of the Housing Authority. 
The advantage stems from their legal legitimacy that is acquired through their 
elected members. 
The failure of the "through train" in the political system may lead some of 
the grass-root oriented politicians to stress on the use of collective actions 
particularly non-institutionalized ones to express demands about public housing 
in order to highlight their efforts to prepare for the coming elections in 1998.^ 
Nevertheless, it is dubious that they will thus, seek to establish a close and 
cooperative relationship with those resident groups that have not allied or 
affiliated with them before. As revealed by the research, they demonstrated a 
much higher propensity to initiate cadre-oriented collective actions. Even after 
they ceased to be Legislative Councillors, the incentive to engage in mass-
oriented collective actions is not much enhanced given the facts that their 
publicity can still draw the attention of the mass media, and the cost involved in 
persuading tenants to join them (for example, they may blame the politicians of 
wasting their time when no tangible result is yielded). Though they may at 
time resort to mass-oriented collective actions, these politicians are more likely 
to initiate them with tenants from their allied or affiliated tenant bodies. On the 
other hand, the suspicion of some resident-group organizers and committee 
members towards politicians as shown by the research, make them reluctant to 
hold joint-actions with the latter even chances are existed. It is very probable 
that the politicians will mainly resort to parliamentary actions or institutionalized 
channels after they gain the legal legitimacy again. 
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Prospects of Pro-China Resident Organizations 
They should be capable of taking a more active role in the public-housing 
arena than resident groups. It is because they are more abundant in resources, 
have representatives in the formal institution and the Housing Authority. 
However, given their pro-China stance, they are probable to adopt a cooperative 
and less critical position towards the Special Administrative Region and its 
housing policies. Even collective actions are initiated, they are inclined to be 
conducted through institutionalized channels such as having closed door 
discussions with representatives from the Housing Authority in order to avoid 
direct confrontations with the Special Administrative Region Government. 
Suggestions of Further Research 
It remains opaque of the relationship and interactions between the pro-China 
resident organizations and the pro-China political parties. Some committee 
members of the former are also members of the latter. Therefore, it deserves to 
be analyzed if there is any change in the nature of their relationship after the 
transfer of sovereignty when there is lesser need to remain a united front towards 
the colonial government. Besides, focus should be placed on if they will 
experience similar relationship dynamic like that of resident groups and the 
grass-root oriented political parties. 
Conclusion 
It is demonstrated that the public housing movement of Hong Kong does not 
face a bright future either in the domain of the political opportunities structure or 
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in the domain of resources. Nevertheless, it does not denote that collective 
actions concerning about public housing problems and policies will diminish. 
Instead, they will be more likely to be held by political parties and pro-China 
resident organizations in the form of cadre-oriented actions. 
/ 
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Notes 
1 In the press conference, the Hong Kong People's Council On Public 
Housing Policies admitted that it failed to apply funding from the Community 
Chest for its actions were regarded as too radical. 
2 The Legislative Council was disbanded after the transfer of sovereignty to 
China. It was replaced by a Provisional Legislative Council. Some of the 
Legislative Councillors and those from the Democratic Party refused to join the 
Provisional Legislative Council and thus, were unable to retain their seats. 
Nevertheless, those elected members of the District Boards, the Urban and the 
Regional Councils can still maintain their seats after the transition. The first 
Legislative Council Election after the transfer of sovereignty is scheduled to be 
held in mid 1998. 
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Appendix 
Background of the Interviewees 
Background of the Interviewees Number 
District Board Members 2 
Committee Members of Resident Groups 3 
Social workers (organizers of resident groups) 3 
Social workers (non-organizers of resident groups) 3 
Senior staff of pro-China resident organizations 2 
Staff of political party 1 
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